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ACTIVITY: EVIDENCE FROM HELSINKI STOCK EXCHANGE 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of this study is to examine the role of high frequency trading in 
limit order book activity in Helsinki Stock Exchange. This study investigates 
the degree of high frequency trading in the market place by identifying high 
frequency trading accounts from limit order data and by looking at their 
trading behavior with respect to order generation and cancellation dynamics.  
 DATA 
The data used in this study is one week order level data from NASDAQ OMX 
Nordic Exchange Helsinki for five selected liquid stocks. The order data, 
which consists of limit orders, cancellations, and executions, is used to build a 
limit order book that captures the trading mechanism of an electronic order-
driven market. The order level data is also used to identify high frequency 
trading accounts by looking at their order generation characteristics. 
RESULTS 
This study finds that the limit order books of the sampled stocks are 
dominated by a handful of high frequency traders employing sophisticated 
trading algorithms and accessing the market with low-latency connections. 
The evidence suggests that these traders are responsible for a majority of the 
order flow and that their order generation is highly periodic. Their order flow 
dynamics indicate that they often cancel a limit order shortly after placing it, 
and that their limit order cancellations are followed rapidly by new limit order 
messages. This study also finds that order flow from high frequency trading 
accounts has short-term effects on stock price for most of the sampled 
securities.  
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flow imbalance, electronic liquidity provision, market microstructure  
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Aalto Yliopisto 
Kauppakorkeakoulu 
  
 
HIGH FREQUENCY – KAUPANKÄYJIEN TOIMINTA HELSINGIN PÖRSSISSÄ 
TUTKIELMAN TAVOITTEET 
Tutkielman tavoitteena on arvioida ns. High Frequency – kaupankäyjien 
roolia Helsingin Pörssissä. High Frequency – kaupankäyjien osuutta pörssin 
toimeksiantojen kokonaismäärästä tutkitaan tunnistamalla High Frequency – 
kauppaa käyviä kaupankäyntitilejä toimeksiantodatasta ja tutkimalla heidän 
toimeksiantokäyttäytymistään.  
 LÄHDEAINESTO 
Tutkimuksen aineisto on viiden osakkeen täydellinen toimeksiantodata 
NASDAQ OMX Nordic Exchange Helsinki – markkinapaikalta yhden viikon 
ajalta. Toimeksiantodata koostuu toimeksiannoista, peruutuksista sekä 
kaupoista, ja sen avulla rakennetaan toimeksiantokanta elektronisen 
toimeksiantopohjaisen markkinapaikan kaupankäyntimekanismien pohjalta. 
TULOKSET 
Tuloksista käy ilmi että tutkittujen osakkeiden kohdalla toimeksiantokantaa 
hallitsee pieni joukko aktiivisia High Frequency – kaupankäyjiä, jotka 
käyttävät kehittyneitä kaupankäyntialgoritmeja ja reagoivat 
markkinamuutoksiin hyvin pienellä viiveellä. Tulokset osoittavat että nämä 
kaupankävijät ovat vastuussa suurimmasta osasta toimeksiantoja, ja että 
niiden toimeksiantokäyttäytymisensä on hyvin jaksottaista. Tutkittujen High 
Frequency –kaupankävijöiden toimeksiantodynamiikka viittaa siihen, että he 
usein peruvat asettamansa toimeksiannot välittömästi niiden asettamisen 
jälkeen. Toisaalta he myös usein asettavat uusia toimeksiantoja välittömästi 
peruutusten jälkeen. Tutkielman tulokset viittaavat myös siihen että heidän 
toimeksiantokäyttäytymisensä vaikuttaa pörssikurssiin lyhyellä aikavälillä. 
AVAINSANAT: tietokonepohjainen kaupankäynti, high frequency -kaupankäynti, 
toimeksiantokanta, toimeksiantojen epätasapaino, elektroninen markkinatakaus, 
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1 Introduction 
1.1. The rise of high frequency trading 
The landscape of equity trading has undergone a dramatic change during the previous decades. 
Traditionally, stock exchanges were organized as floor-based marketplaces where buyers and sellers 
were represented by intermediaries who arranged the trades between market participants. In the 
floor-based system, the trading was usually concentrated in a single physical location in any given 
country, the national stock exchange. Today the old system has given way to electronic trading 
through different trading venues. This shift has been driven forward by technological development 
and changes in regulation concerning securities trading (Kirilenko et al., 2011). Advances in trading 
systems, in the ability of market participants to analyze data, and in the overall technological 
infrastructure supporting computerized equity trading has created an appealing environment for 
market participants to develop sophisticated trading strategies that employ sophisticated algorithms. 
Activity in the limit order books of computerized trading venues is nowadays dominated by the 
interaction between these algorithms (Hasbrouck & Saar, 2011), yet not so much is known about 
their exact trading behavior.   
High frequency trading is responsible for a major share of the total trading and quote volume in 
stock exchanges all over the world. The share of high frequency trading of all equity trades has been 
estimated to account for over 68 per cent of the total dollar volume in the US (Brogaard, 2010b). 
Given the rapid development in the equities trading industry, these numbers are probably 
conservative estimates of the share of high frequency trading as of now. The Securities and 
Exchange Commission recently referred to high frequency trading as “one of the most significant 
market structure developments in recent years” (SEC, 2010). High frequency trading has drawn 
significant public attention after the “Flash Crash” on May 6th 2010, and many regulatory bodies 
are undergoing discussions about imposing rules for high frequency traders (see IOSCO, 2011 for 
an overview). Regulators are concerned that algorithmic trading, and high frequency trading in 
particular, may have negative effects on market quality in times of severe market stress, and that 
high frequency trading deteriorates equality of market participants (Angel & McCabe, 2010). 
1.2. Concerns over high frequency trading 
There is an ongoing discussion about the merits of high frequency trading. Regulators and market 
participants have raised a number of concerns about the practices of high frequency traders. One 
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major concern is associated with the fact that high frequency traders are replacing traditional market 
makers as suppliers of liquidity (Gerig & Michayluk, 2010). High frequency traders acting as 
electronic liquidity providers (ELPs) have no requirements to maintain a fair and orderly market 
like their traditional counterparts, nor do they have a minimum amount of shares to provide, or a 
minimum time to offer a quote (Arnuk & Saluzzi, 2009). ELPs can thus turn off their supply of 
liquidity at any time, which can have severe effects on market efficiency (Hasbrouck & Saar, 2011). 
Regulators in Europe and in the US are considering whether high frequency traders should face 
quotation obligations like those imposed on registered market makers (SEC, 2010).  
Another concern associated with high frequency traders comes from their ability to engage in so 
called predatory activities. High frequency traders can generate false trading signals by using their 
speed advantage to issue a massive number of orders on one side of the order book and thus change 
the perceived demand/supply of a stock. This trading strategy, called layering, is identified as 
market abuse in most equity trading venues. On May 6th 2011 The Financial Services Authority 
(FSA) fined Swift Trade Inc., a Canadian company, for an £8 million penalty for layering in the 
London Stock Exchange (FSA, 2011). Swift Trade used its speed advantage to place large orders on 
one side of the book in order to create a signal of a change in the supply/demand of the security, 
while simultaneously trading on the other side of the book and making a profit from the share price 
movement. This was followed by rapid deletion of the large initial orders, which were never 
intended to be traded. Although most high frequency traders presumably do not engage in these 
activities, the case against Swift Trade shows the extent to which high frequency traders can utilize 
their speed advantage over other market participants and highlights the need for regulatory review 
over their practices.       
Third area of concern is that high frequency traders can extract surplus from institutional investors 
who need to trade large amount of shares within a short time interval. This concern is based on the 
notion that high frequency traders have the ability to observe the trading intentions of an 
institutional investor and use their speed advantage to trade ahead of the institutional investor (see 
for example Zhang, 2010, Cartea & Penalva, 2011). Thus, the debate over high frequency trading 
can be viewed as a concern that one group of players are in some way victimizing other, 
technologically less sophisticated parties (Kearns et al., 2010). Hasbrouck and Saar (2011) argue 
that while the early advocates of electronic equity markets envisioned equal access to all market 
participants, the structure of today’s market place resembles that of floor based markets where 
access to the floor was purchased or rented in the form of a seat. The co-location services offered to 
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high frequency traders resemble the seats of floor based exchanges, as co-located traders have a 
significant speed advantage over other market participants (Hasbrouck & Saar, 2011). 
Fourth commonly raised concern regarding high frequency trading is the potential systemic risk 
arising from computerized trading activity. According to Gomber et al. (2011), such risks can result 
from malfunctioning or rogue algorithms that can drive the market infrastructure to the point where 
it can no longer cope with the amount of incoming orders. A malfunctioning algorithm might also 
have the potential to drive the price of a security into an unintended direction and cause severe 
disturbance in the market. These concerns are highlighted by the diminishing role of traditional 
market makers as high frequency traders acting as ELPs have taken their role in providing markets 
with liquidity.   
On the other hand, proponents of high frequency trading argue that high frequency trading improves 
market quality by increasing liquidity and reducing bid-ask spreads (Zhang, 2010). The proponents 
also argue that high frequency traders improve the price discovery process of markets by using their 
speed to quickly analyze changes in macroeconomic conditions, company fundamentals or other 
factors affecting equity valuations. To address the issue about equal access to markets, proponents 
of high frequency trading argue that guaranteeing equal access to market data in a continuous and 
fragmented market is physically impossible as geographic dispersion alone produces transmission 
delays. Garvey and Wu (2009) find that market participants located near New York City experience 
faster order execution times and lower trading costs compared to market participant situated further 
away from the exchanges.     
The above dimensions in the debate over high frequency trading render it both interesting and 
important, because high frequency traders have drastically changed the equity trading landscape. 
While most of the concerns over high frequency trading in the media are about issues concerning 
predatory activities, most academic studies on the subject examine the effects of high frequency 
trading on market quality.  
1.3. Existing literature at a glance 
This section briefly discusses the definition of high frequency trading and covers the findings of the 
seminal papers in the field. For a more detailed review of the existing literature, see Chapter 3. 
Academic studies have discussed formal definitions for algorithmic and high frequency trading, but 
have not reached a clear, widely accepted definition (Brogaard, 2011b, Gomber et al., 2011). The 
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exact definition will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2, where the following definition is 
chosen for this paper: high frequency trading is a subset of algorithmic trading in which: (1) holding 
periods are extremely short, (2) a massive number of orders are generated and cancelled, (3) the 
purpose is to make instant profits, and (4) virtually no open position is carried at the end of the day. 
Although the academic literature concerning high frequency trading is only developing, there are a 
number of studies that examine the impact of high frequency trading on market quality. The 
existing literature shows mixed results on the effects of high frequency trading on market quality. 
While some studies identify the general improvement in liquidity and reduction in spreads as 
stemming from the increased share of computerized trading, other studies provide evidence of 
possible harmful effects under stressful market conditions or point out the possibility of predatory 
practices which can be exploited by high frequency trading.  
One of the earliest studies about high frequency trading is from Zhang (2010). His paper suggests 
that the increased share of high frequency trading is positively correlated with stock price volatility 
and that high frequency trading hinders market’s ability to incorporate information about firm 
fundamentals into asset prices. Zhang also finds a stronger effect of the increased volatility for 
stocks with high institutional holdings, which suggests that high frequency traders are able to take 
advantage of individual investors who trade in large blocks. 
Kirilenko et al. (2010) study how high frequency trading contributed to the “flash crash” in May 
2010. The paper examines over 15 000 trading accounts that are classified into different categories 
with respect to trader type. The results of the study are that high frequency traders did not trigger 
the crash but their behavior exacerbated market volatility during that day. The authors point out that 
high frequency traders may create a false signal of ample liquidity with their high levels of trading 
activity, and because of this, the trading activity of institutional investors may produce a larger than 
expected price impact. The authors also analyzed the trading patterns of the high frequency traders 
in their data sample. They find that due to their speed advantage or superior ability to predict price 
changes, high frequency traders are able to buy right as the prices are about to increase and vice 
versa. 
Jarrow and Protter (2011) also report negative aspects of high frequency trading. Their paper shows 
that high frequency traders can decrease the efficiency of the markets through increased volatility 
and asset mispricing. The authors show how high frequency traders can create a trend in market 
prices that they subsequently exploit to the disadvantage of ordinary traders. The authors point out 
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that the trend is created through a collective but uncoordinated action by the high frequency traders 
who observe large incoming orders from institutional investors. 
Cartea and Penalva (2011) analyze the impact of high frequency trading in equity markets by a 
model with three types of investors: liquidity traders, market makers and high frequency traders. 
The authors argue, much like Zhang (2010), that high frequency traders extract surplus from 
institutional investors by increasing the price impact of trades in proportion to the size of the trade. 
This effect makes the marketplace a less effective channel through which investors can convert 
equity into cash and vice versa.   
On the other hand, research by Brogaard (2011a) suggests that high frequency trading decreases 
intraday volatility. The paper also examines how volatility affects high frequency trading by 
analyzing high frequency trading activity around company news announcements. The paper 
suggests that volatility generally increases the extent to which high frequency traders supply 
liquidity, and decreases the amount of liquidity high frequency traders take from the market. 
Castura et al. (2010) also provide evidence that high frequency trading has made the U.S. markets 
more liquid and effective. They find a sympathetic relationship between high frequency trading and 
short-term volatility, liquidity and bid-ask spreads. The authors note that the presence of high 
frequency trading has benefited all investors by reducing average trading costs in the market.  
Cvitanic and Kirilenko (2010) examine the impact of high frequency trading on asset prices. The 
theoretical model constructed in their paper suggests that the presence of a high frequency trader is 
likely to change the average transaction price, even in the absence of new information. They also 
find that in a market with high frequency traders, the distribution of transaction prices has more 
mass around the center and thinner tails.  
Hasbrouck and Saar (2011) study high frequency trading, or “the millisecond environment”, as they 
call it, using order-level data from NASDAQ. The authors develop a measure of high frequency 
trading by identifying strategic runs, which are linked order submissions, cancellations and 
executions that are part of a dynamic trading strategy. These dynamic trading strategies refer to 
strategies that are conditional on the state of the order book, and thus triggered by events on the 
micro-market level, such as changes in bid/ask prices. The empirical findings of the paper suggest 
that high frequency trading improves market quality with respect to liquidity, volatility and bid-ask 
spreads.  
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Cont et al. (2008) develop a continuous-time stochastic model to study the dynamics of limit order 
books. The paper models a limit order book as a continuous-time Markov process that tracks the 
number of limit orders at each price level of the book. In a Markov process, the next state of the 
process depends only on the current state, and thus the past and future of the process are 
independent. In their model, arrival of limit orders, market orders, and cancellations are modeled as 
Poisson processes where the arrival rate of orders depends on the distance to the bid/ask price. This 
model is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3. The authors are able to compute probabilities of 
events, such as an increase in the mid-price, conditional on the state of the order book. In addition, 
they estimate parameters for their model using high frequency data from the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange. Their model can capture short-term dynamics of a limit order book, and can thus be used 
to create a model for a high frequency trader engaged in statistical arbitrage.  
In order to gain deeper understanding of the effects of high frequency trading, academics have 
started to look at the actual order flow data on a microscopic level instead of aggregate trade data. 
Studies investigating the economic forces affecting quotes, trades and prices fall under the label 
market microstructure studies. Advances in trading technology during recent years have also 
increased the quality of data available for academic studies in the field. One could argue that 
capturing the dynamics of high frequency trading is only possible using high frequency data, and 
thus, most recent papers apply methods to study the impact of high speed trading by analyzing limit 
order book data from the markets. 
1.4. Motivation for this study 
Both regulators and market participants (IOSCO, 2011, SEC, 2010) are calling for more studies 
about high frequency trading to understand its effects on market efficiency, fairness and integrity of 
markets, and the stability and resiliency of markets. The existing literature uses a variety of methods 
to study high frequency trading and its impact on market quality. The results seem to be mixed. On 
one hand, high frequency trading is shown to make markets more efficient, but on the other, high 
frequency traders are shown to possess an advantage that allows them to discriminate other market 
participants. 
The existing literature about the role of high frequency trading focuses on the U.S. markets, but it is 
reasonable to assume that high frequency trading is widespread in most developed nations with 
efficient capital markets. The lack of studies about high frequency trading outside the U.S. makes it 
difficult to assess the importance of high frequency trading on a global level. Especially in Europe, 
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where financial markets are deeply integrated, policy makers would benefit from high frequency 
trading studies using European data. 
This study will aim to contribute to the academia by providing detailed information about high 
frequency trading in NASDAQ OMX Nordic Exchange Helsinki. The information provided by this 
study can be used by academics to assess the need for further studies about the role of high 
frequency trading in European equity markets.  
1.5. Research questions 
The purpose of this study is to estimate the degree of high frequency trading in Helsinki Stock 
Exchange by using order level data from NASDAQ OMX Nordic Exchange Helsinki. The data 
allows construction of a limit order book, which is used to compute a number of high frequency 
trading related metrics, such as the order flow imbalance, the hazard rated and the number of orders 
generated and cancelled. These measures are discussed in more detail in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. 
More precisely, this study aims to answer the following research questions: 
I. What is the degree of high frequency trading in NASDAQ OMX Nordic Exchange Helsinki 
and what are its characteristics with respect to trading strategies? 
II. Are there any identifiable dynamics in the order generation and cancellation activities of the 
identified high frequency traders? 
III. Is there evidence of any short-term relationship between high frequency trading order flow 
and stock price?  
Estimating the degree of high frequency trading NASDAQ OMX Nordic Exchange Helsinki serves 
as an important research objective as regulators in many developed countries are discussing the role 
of high frequency traders and the need for additional regulation concerning them. Also, identifying 
the characteristics and the trading strategies of the high frequency traders in NASDAQ OMX 
Nordic Exchange Helsinki contributes to a broader understanding of high frequency trading and can 
help to clarify their role in the overall equity market structure.  
The findings of this study are useful in assessing the need for further studies about high frequency 
trading and its impact on securities markets. Further research on the topic will then aid regulators in 
their challenging task of setting up an efficient regulatory framework for computerized securities 
trading. 
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1.6. Empirical study 
The empirical study is based on order flow data from NASDAQ OMX Nordic Exchange Helsinki, 
which contains all (buy and sell) limit orders, market orders, and cancellations for five selected 
liquid stocks for a  one week period in November 2010. The stocks in the data are Nokia 
Corporation, UMP-Kymmene Corporation, Sampo PLC A, Fortum Corporation and Stora Enso Oyj 
R. The limit orders, market orders and cancellations are used to construct a representative limit 
order book for the sample period. A limit order is an order to trade a certain amount of a security at 
a given price. A limit orders is posted to the electronic trading system where it is recorded in the 
order book until it is executed against a market order or it is cancelled. A market order is an order to 
trade a certain amount of a security at the best available price in the limit order book. When a 
market order arrives, it is matched with the best available price in the order book and a trade occurs. 
The data used in this study allows observing the state of the limit order book at any given time. The 
state of the order book gives the number of outstanding buy and sell orders at each possible price. 
The lowest price for which there is an outstanding sell order is called the ask price and the highest 
buy price is called the bid price. The data is described in more detail in Chapter 4, where the limit 
order book construction process is also discussed. 
The degree of high frequency trading can be analyzed by looking at the dynamics of the order book. 
A number of measures are calculated to investigate the high frequency trading environment in 
NASDAQ OMX Nordic Exchange Helsinki. These include hazard rates for order submissions and 
cancellations. The hazard rate for submissions and cancellations gives the intensity of submissions 
and cancellations conditional on the time since any order book event. Also, the speed of response to 
market effects is calculated from the order book. This metric measures the time it takes for market 
participants to react to order book events which either increases the bid price or decreases the ask 
price. The different measures about the degree of high frequency trading are discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 5.    
1.7. Results 
The findings of this study suggest that the limit order book in NASDAQ OMX Nordic Exchange 
Helsinki is dominated by a handful of high frequency traders using sophisticated algorithms and 
accessing the marketplace with very low latencies. Together the trading accounts identified as high 
frequency traders capture a majority of the order flow, measured as their ratio of limit orders and 
cancellations to aggregated market values.  
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This study also finds that the high frequency traders’ order generation dynamic is highly periodic, 
as measured with message runs. The high periodicity indicates that the high frequency traders react 
to changes in the order book by simultaneously updating a vast amount of their existing orders. 
Further, this study finds two discernible dynamics in the high frequency traders’ order flow 
behavior. On one hand their limit order cancellations are followed by new limit order messages 
within time period of 200ms. On the other hand they often cancel their limit orders rapidly after 
placing a limit order in the system, which indicates that they constantly update their limit order 
offering.  
The results of this study also indicate that there exists a weak short-term relationship between high 
frequency trading order flow and stock price change. The results suggests that increased limit order 
arrival rates for buy orders tend to increase the stock price, and increased limit order arrival rates for 
sell order to decrease the stock price. The duration of this relationship varies from 150ms to 60ms, 
depending on the security, and is non-existent for the most liquid share in the sample. 
1.8. Structure of the study 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides key definitions and concepts, as 
well as information about the most common high frequency trading strategies. In Chapter 3, the 
existing literature is discussed in more detail. Chapter 4 describes the data and methods used in the 
paper. Then, Chapter 5 identifies high frequency trading accounts from the data. Finally, Chapter 6 
discusses the findings of the study and Chapter 7 concludes.   
 
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2 Definitions and related concepts 
This chapter discusses how prior literature has defined high frequency trading and gives the exact 
definition used in this study. The purpose of reviewing the definition of high frequency trading is to 
establish a connection with this study and the previous academic literature, and to make the findings 
of this study easier to reproduce. In addition, this chapter discusses related concepts and common 
high frequency trading strategies, which are divided into separate sections.  Section 2.4 briefly 
covers the background behind the rise of high frequency trading. 
2.1. Formal definition of high frequency trading 
In order to assess the importance of high frequency trading and its effect on trading in financial 
securities, clear definitions of high frequency trading and related concepts are needed. 
Unfortunately, no clear definition has so far emerged in the academic literature (Brogaard, 2011b, 
Gomber et al., 2011). The lack of clear definition is partly due to the fact that academic literature 
about the topic is only starting to develop, and partly because of the rapid development in 
algorithmic and high frequency trading strategies.  
In general, algorithmic trading is viewed as a tool for professional traders to automatically execute a 
desired trading strategy without the need for human intervention. High frequency trading is often 
classified as part of algorithmic trading, but all forms or algorithmic trading cannot be classified as 
high frequency trading (IOSCO, 2011). The definition of high frequency trading is thus best 
developed by first discussing the definition of algorithmic trading. Hendershott and Riordan (2009) 
define algorithmic trading as the use of computer algorithms to automatically make trading 
decisions, submit orders, and manage those orders after submission. Gomber et al. (2011) identify 
seven common characteristics of algorithmic and high frequency trading: (1) pre-defined trading 
decisions, (2) use by professional traders, (3) observing market data in real time, (4) automated 
order submission, (5) automated order management, (6) no human intervention, and (7) use of 
direct market access. In addition to these common characteristics, the authors also identify a set of 
characteristics of algorithmic trading which do not hold for high frequency trading. These are: (1) 
used in agent trading, (2) object to minimize market impact for large orders, (3) goal to achieve a 
particular benchmark, (4) holding periods from days to months, and (5) object to work an order 
through time and across markets. Algorithmic trading can thus be thought as a broader set of trading 
strategies, of which high frequency trading forms one part.  
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To be more precise, Zhang (2010) identifies high frequency trading as a subset of algorithmic 
trading that differs with respect to holding periods and trading purposes. Brogaard (2011b) adopts 
the definition of SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission, 2010), who refers to high frequency 
trading as “professional traders acting in a proprietary capacity that engage in strategies that 
generate a large number of trades on a daily basis”. Cvitanic and Kirilenko (2010) are more specific 
and define high frequency trading as trading that employs extremely fast automated programs for 
generating, routing, canceling, and executing orders in electronic markets. Further, according to 
their definition, high frequency traders submit and cancel a massive number of orders and execute a 
large number of trades, trade in and out of positions very quickly, and finish each trading day 
without a significant open position.   
This paper draws on the work by Cvitanic and Kirilenko (2010) by defining high frequency trading 
as a subset of algorithmic trading where: (1) holding periods are extremely short, (2) a massive 
number of orders are generated and cancelled, (3) the purpose is to make instant profits, and (4) 
virtually no open position is carried at the end of the day.  
 
Graph 1: High frequency trading versus algorithmic trading and long-term investing 
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When discussing the role and impact of high frequency trading, the concept of latency must be 
discussed in more detail as well. Hasbrouck and Saar (2011) define latency as the time it takes to 
learn about an event, generate a response, and have the exchange act on the response. This 
definition of latency can be thought to be composed of three individual parts: (1) the time it takes 
for the information to reach the trader, (2) the time it takes for the trader’s algorithm to analyze the 
incoming data and generate a response, and (3) the time it takes for the response to reach the 
exchange and get implemented. The first and third parts of these are heavily influenced by the 
market operator’s infrastructure and possible co-location services they are providing, while the 
second part is only influenced by the market participants own trading processes. 
2.2. Algorithmic trading strategies 
This section describes some of the most common algorithmic trading strategies. The development 
of the strategies is subject to the degree of sophistication in their underlying trading algorithms.  
Participation rate algorithms are relatively simple mechanisms that aim to build or liquidate a target 
position in an instrument by participating in the market up to a given volume. By limiting the rate of 
participation, these algorithms can be used to liquidate a large position discreetly over a longer 
period, which is designed to reduce the market impact of the trades. More sophisticated versions of 
these algorithms can include randomized participation rates, which make it harder for other market 
participants to detect such strategies (Gomber et al., 2011).  
Time weighted average price (TWAP) algorithms divide a large order into pieces which are sent to 
the markets with pre-determined time intervals. TWAPs can also vary their order sizes and time 
intervals to avoid detection by other market participants.  
Implementation shortfall algorithms try to minimize the market impact of a large order optimizing 
an execution plan with respect to estimated price movements caused by the execution. The 
algorithm uses historical data to predict the optimal size and time periods for execution. More 
sophisticated implementation shortfall algorithms analyze real-time market data to evaluate and 
adapt their optimal execution plan.  
2.3. High frequency trading strategies 
Because of the ambiguousness of the definition of high frequency trading, and because the 
community of market participants using high frequency trading strategies is highly diverse, it is 
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impossible to exhaustively list all possible trading strategies that can benefit from employing high 
frequency trading. Instead, the following sections discuss some of the best known strategies. The 
categorization is based on Aldridge (2010) and each category is discussed in its own subsection.  
2.3.1. Electronic liquidity provision 
Like traditional market makers, electronic liquidity providers post offers on both sides of the market 
and profit from earning the bid-ask spread. In this strategy, which is referred to as spread capturing, 
an ELP earns the difference between the price at which market participants can buy securities from 
the ELP and the price at which they can sell them to the ELP. Unlike traditional market makers, 
ELPs have no formal market-making obligations, and can thus enter and exit positions very quickly. 
ELPs can also profit from rebates or reduced transaction fees which are provided by trading venues 
in order to increase liquidity. The strategies that benefit from the asymmetric pricing schemes are 
commonly known as Rebate Driven Strategies. 
Electronic liquidity providers use mainly limit orders to execute their trading strategy (Aldridge, 
2010). As the gain from one individual trade is very small, the strategy requires the trader to 
constantly move in and out of positions to capture profits. As a result, these strategies operate at 
very high frequencies and position holding times are extremely short which results to a massive 
number of orders generated by the trader. Electronic liquidity provision is thus extremely sensitive 
to a trader’s latency and its ability to handle massive amounts of data.    
2.3.2. Market microstructure trading 
Market microstructure trading refers to trading strategies that involve the dimension of specifically 
addressing the intent and future actions of other market participants. These strategies often involve 
game-theoretic approaches to discover the intentions and information content of another market 
participant. The goal of market microstructure trading strategies is to identify informed investors 
and the objectives of their trading operations by employing an algorithm to extract information from 
the order book. One way of doing this is to monitor the order book for changes in the order 
aggressiveness, which refers to the percentage of market orders and marketable limit order with 
respect to total submitted orders. The order aggressiveness can be used to estimate the degree of 
investors who believe that the price of the security is about to move away from its current price. 
Vega (2007) shows that better informed market participants trade more aggressively, which implies 
that order aggressiveness could predict future price changes. 
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Market microstructure trading strategies also monitor order flow, which can reflect market 
participants’ beliefs about the upcoming direction of the market. Cont et al. (2011) show that over 
short time intervals, price changes are mainly driven by order flow imbalance, which is the 
imbalance of supply and demand at the best bid and ask prices. A Supporting finding comes from 
the foreign exchange market, where Love and Payne (2006) find that order flow directly accounts 
for at least half of all the information transmitted into market prices.        
2.3.3. Event trading 
Event trading strategies refer to strategies in which high frequency traders trade on the market 
movements surrounding company news announcements and other information arrivals. The goal of 
event trading strategies is to identify portfolios that return positive profits over the time window 
surrounding the specific event. The holding time in these strategies can vary anywhere from a few 
seconds to several hours and the main driver of profits is the speed of response to the events, which 
makes the strategy especially suitable for high frequency traders.  
The event trading strategies can be used to engage in trading following either expected or 
unexpected information arrivals. Expected information arrivals constitute of releases of 
macroeconomic indicator for example. The event trading algorithms compare events to similar 
historical events and estimate expected price changes in the securities based on historical price 
behavior surrounding these events.   
2.3.4. Statistical arbitrage 
In statistical arbitrage strategies, traders profit from short-lived discrepancies between prices of 
securities. Statistical arbitrage strategies are based on extensive data mining and identification of 
pervasive statistical relationships between two securities or some variables linked to the securities. 
For example, the relationship could be between the prices of two different securities, the price of a 
security and its price in the past, the price of a security and the volatility of another. The idea in 
statistical arbitrage is that if at any time the relationship deviates from its historical pattern, the 
relationship will mean-revert to its natural level and a trade should be placed towards that direction.     
These strategies are not conducted by high frequency traders alone, but their speed advantage 
allows them to apply statistical arbitrage strategies to a wider set of relationships and to effectively 
compete in areas where the strategies are most often used.  
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2.4. Background for high frequency trading 
Gomber et al. (2011) identify four drivers for the emergence of algorithmic trading and high 
frequency trading: (1) new market access models and (2) fee structures, (3) a dramatic reduction in 
latency, and (4) an increase in competition and order flow. 
The first driver is associated with market access. Similar to the floor-based trading, market access in 
most electronic markets is only granted to selected members. These members, which are referred to 
as brokers, are the only ones allowed to conduct trade directly at the marketplace, and are thus in a 
role of market intermediaries for other investors.  This role has been altered by new market access 
models, Direct Access Model (DMA) and Sponsored Access (SA). In DMA, an investor’s orders 
are forwarded directly to the exchange through the broker’s infrastructure and the broker is able to 
conduct pre-trade risk checks. In SA, an investor who is not a member of the market can access the 
respective market by routing its orders through its own infrastructure while using a registered 
member’s trading ID. Both DMA and SA allow investors to access the market with significantly 
lower latencies compared to traditional market access.     
Another driver for algorithmic and high frequency trading is the market operators’ fee structures 
that incentivize large order flow and liquidity provision. If the pricing for liquidity providing and 
liquidity reducing orders differ, it is referred to as asymmetric pricing and is supposed to encourage 
liquidity provision in the market. In asymmetric pricing, liquidity providing orders are charged a 
lower fee or even a rebate in some markets, whereas liquidity reducing orders are charged a higher 
fee. Both special discounts for automatically generated order flow and asymmetric pricing has made 
high frequency trading strategies more widespread since they are able to use their speed advantage 
to make profits using discounts and possible rebates.  
The use of computerized order driven markets has dramatically reduced the latency, or the time it 
takes to post a quote to the market and to receive market information. Lower latency reduces the 
risk an investor faces when posting an order to the market. According to Liu (2009), the risk can be 
divided into two components: the Free Trading Risk (FTO) and non-execution risk. FTO implies 
that the value of the bid or ask offer in the system is subject to arrival of public information. The 
non-execution risk means that the order might not get executed according to the investor’s optimal 
schedule, which creates an opportunity cost. Lower latency allows an investor to react faster to any 
arrival of public information and to cancel and revise her orders accordingly. Increase in computing 
power has led to sharp reduction in the average latency as the market system can process orders and 
execute them faster. Lower latency allows an investor to react to an arrival of public knowledge 
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faster and to cancel or to revise an existing bid or ask quote accordingly. In addition to 
technological change, co-location services have contributed to the reduction in latencies in the 
previous decade (Gomber et al., 2011). Co-location services allow the market participants to place 
their trading machines in physical proximity to the infrastructure of the market operator, which 
significantly decreases their latency. 
Increased competition in the securities market has been driven by regulatory changes. In Europe, 
the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (European Commission 2004) fostered competition 
by harmonizing regulation for investment services across the member states of the European 
Economic Area. The directive introduced Multilateral Trading Facilities (MTF), financial trading 
systems which compete with traditional stock exchanges for trading volume. As opposed to 
traditional exchanges, MTFs do not have a listing process but rather allow for buyers and sellers to 
trade with securities listed on other exchanges. In order to gain market share, MTFs used aggressive 
pricing and forced traditional exchanges to revise their pricing schemes as well (Gomber et al., 
2011). This fragmentation of the market imposed additional costs for market participants in the 
form of searching for best prices across different trading venues (Gomber et al., 2011). To tackle 
these costs, algorithmic trading strategies emerged which automatically optimized trading a large 
block of shares through different venues. 
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3 Review of literature 
This chapter discusses the existing literature in more detail. Each section presents one paper in the 
field. 
3.1. Menkveld (2011) 
A recent paper by Menkveld (2011) links the rise of high frequency trading with increased 
fragmentation in the equities trading. The author analyzes Chi-X, a multilateral trading facility 
(MTF) that entered European equity trading in 2007, in its early days. The paper suggests that the 
presence of a high frequency trader, who operated also in the incumbent marketplace, significantly 
increased Chi-X’s market share and drove down bid-ask spreads. Menkveld focuses on a single 
high frequency trader on Chi-X and gives interesting details about its operations as a multi-venue 
market maker. The high frequency trader uses capital to produce liquidity and earns revenue from 
the bid-ask spread and changes in mid-quotes during the life of non-zero positions. 
Menkveld uses a microeconomic perspective and analyzes the profitability of the high frequency 
trader. His empirical study suggests that the high frequency trader makes a gross profit of 0,88€ per 
trade, which is a result of a 1,55€ profit from the spread and a position loss of 0,68€. The position 
loss here refers to the risk of mid-quote movements during market-making, and the author notes that 
the position loss is consistent across all stocks in the scope of the study. This finding gives support 
to the proponents of high frequency trading since it indicates that high frequency traders suffer 
constant positioning losses and thus cannot earn a profit by speculating on the expense of other 
traders.  
The author also reports that the high frequency trader earns roughly five times more from trades of 
large stocks, as compared to trades of small stocks (with respect to market capitalization). 
Menkveld suggests this is because trades in large stocks are generally twice the size of those in 
small stocks. Another interesting finding of the paper is that the high frequency trader does not 
actively manage cross-security positions to remain market neutral, but instead seems to engage in 
the market-making on a stock-by-stock basis.         
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3.2. Zhang (2010) 
One of the first academics to study high frequency was Zhang (2010), who investigated the effects 
of high frequency trading in US capital markets. The definition used in Zhang’s paper is line with 
the one used in this study. In other words, high frequency trading is considered a subset of 
algorithmic trading strategies, and that high frequency trading differs from other algorithmic trading 
strategies with respect to holding periods and trading purposes. Zhang focuses on the effects of high 
frequency trading on stock price volatility and price discovery. The author notes that high frequency 
traders acting as ELPs can lower volatility by offering liquidity for individual investors and that 
ELPs generally do not profit from high volatility since they earn the bid-ask spread.  
Keeping this in mind, the author identifies three channels through which high frequency traders can 
increase stock price volatility. First, high frequency traders acting as ELPs can withdraw their 
supply of liquidity at any time, and thus a high trading volume might not be a reliable indicator of 
liquidity. Zhang argues that this can create large swings in the prices, since fundamental investors 
often use trading volume as a proxy for liquidity. Second, high frequency traders can create 
momentum by placing large amounts of unidirectional orders and thus attract other momentum 
traders, which then creates prices swings and increases volatility. Finally, high frequency traders 
can detect large orders from institutional investors and use their speed advantage to trade in the 
same direction with the institutional investor, increasing (decreasing) the price of her buy (sell) 
order. 
Zhang’s empirical study about the effects of high frequency trading on stock price volatility uses a 
regression model where volatility is regressed by the following factors: high frequency trading, 
earnings surprise volatility, sales growth volatility, analyst forecast dispersion, market leverage, 
firm age, share of institutional holdings, inverse of stock price, firm size, book-to-market ratio, and 
the past 12-month stock return. The results from the regression with respect to the control variables 
are in line with prior academic studies on determinants of stock price volatility. To move on to the 
interesting part of the result, Zhang’s study suggests that high frequency trading is positively 
correlated with stock price volatility, and that the correlation is stronger in stocks with high 
institutional holdings, and stronger in times of high market uncertainty. These results suggest that 
high frequency traders are able to extract surplus from institutional investors by detecting large 
orders and using their speed advantage to front-run these orders.   
In addition to volatility, Zhang studies the effects of high frequency trading on market’s price 
discovery process. The author notes that the additional liquidity high frequency traders bring to the 
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market makes it easier for institutional investors to change their portfolio allocations to reflect 
changes in firm fundamentals. To contrast this, Zhang argues that high frequency traders are not 
interested in firm fundamentals per se, and trade solely on short-term stock returns. He then goes on 
to examine if the interaction between these two types of investors, institutional investors who care 
about firm fundamentals and high frequency traders who do not, has long-term effects on price 
dynamics.  
Zhang’s empirical study about the effects of high frequency trading on price discovery process uses 
analyst earnings revisions and earnings surprise to proxy for firm fundamental news. The author 
then examines how firm fundamental news affects the stock price returns by regressing the returns 
with various control variables. The results of the regressions suggest that high frequency trading 
increases the positive stock price reaction of (positive) earnings news but also increases the 
subsequent price reversal. This finding suggests that high frequency trading hinders the price 
discovery process as it pushes prices too far in the direction of earnings news. As a result, stock 
prices reverse after the initial reaction.  
Zhang hypothesizes three channels through which high frequency traders could cause an 
overreaction in the share price, following firm fundamental news. The author’s first hypothesis is 
that the trading of institutional and high frequency traders is independent, so that the high frequency 
trader first observes the company news and reacts to it, which moves the share price. Then the 
institutional investor observes the news and reacts to it, without taking into account the initial 
reaction of the high frequency trader, which again moves the share price in the same direction. The 
second hypothesis of Zhang is that high frequency traders interact with institutional investors by 
front-running their orders after earnings news. If the high frequency trader can successfully front-
run the institutional investor, the overall price reaction is stronger than what it would have been 
without the high frequency trader. The author’s third hypothesis for the underlying process in 
overreaction is that high frequency traders induce other momentum traders to trade in the direction 
of the earnings news.  
3.3. Kirilenko et al. (2010) 
Kirilenko et al. (2010) investigate the “flash crash” on May 6th, 2010 and examine the role of high 
frequency traders during the day of extreme market volatility. On that day, many US stock market 
indices, index futures, options and exchange traded funds (ETFs) experienced a temporary price 
drop of over 5 per cent. To investigate the role of different types of market participants in the course 
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of events, the authors classify over 15 000 trading accounts into one of six categories: (1) high 
frequency traders, (2) intermediaries, (3) fundamental buyers, (4) fundamental sellers, (5) 
opportunistic traders and (6) noise traders.  
The authors classify the trading accounts into six categories with the following criteria. 
Intermediaries are those traders who engage in market-making strategy, where a large amount of 
buy and sell orders are generated, and a net inventory is managed so as to keep net positions close 
to zero. The authors then define as High Frequency Traders those Intermediaries who generate a 
very large number of orders. Fundamental Traders are traders who accumulate a significant net 
position by the end of the day, and they are further classified into Fundamental Buyers and 
Fundamental Sellers, with respect to their accumulated positions. Noise traders are traders who 
trade a very small number of shares during the day, and the rest of the trading accounts are 
classified as Opportunistic Traders, who may behave both like Intermediaries and Fundamental 
Traders.   
The authors find that the trading accounts classified as high frequency traders traded almost one 
third of the total dollar volume of the day. In addition to that, the net positions of the individual high 
frequency traders fluctuated around zero. The authors comment that this fact alone gives proof that 
high frequency traders could have done very little to prevent the dip in the prices. It is also worth 
noting that these two findings are in line with the definition of high frequency trading, as discussed 
in Chapter 2. The authors also calculated an aggressiveness ratio, which gives the ratio of 
transactions that remove liquidity from the market as a share of a trader’s total transactions. The 
aggressiveness ratios for High Frequency Traders, Intermediaries, Fundamental Buyers and 
Fundamental Sellers are 45.68%, 41.62%, 64.09% and 61.13%, respectively. A ratio of less (more) 
than 50.00% suggests that the trader is a net provider (taker) of liquidity. 
The authors examine the trading behavior of high frequency traders during the course of the day. 
They report that the high frequency traders initially accumulated a (relatively small) long position 
as the prices started to decline, but liquidated their positions quickly when the decline started to 
accelerate. The authors employ a second-by-second regression of the net holdings of high frequency 
traders with respect to share price. The results of their regression suggest that high frequency traders 
trade in the same direction as the contemporaneous price (with one second interval) and the prices 
of the last five seconds. In other words, high frequency traders seem to be buying for five seconds if 
the contemporaneous price is rising, and selling for five seconds if the price is declining. Another 
interesting finding of their regression is that the High Frequency Traders seem to reverse their 
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direction of trading after 10 seconds, so that they liquidate their net positions between 10 to 20 
seconds after the contemporaneous price increase. The authors note that, possibly due to their speed 
advantage, the High Frequency Traders are able to buy right as the price is about to increase, after 
which they liquidate their positions. 
The authors find that High Frequency Traders did not alter their trading strategy on May 6th, 2010, 
and that the price decline was initiated by a disproportionally large sell program by Fundamental 
Traders. High Frequency Traders, together with Intermediaries were providing liquidity to the 
selling program, but after their net inventories started to accumulate, they started to liquidate their 
positions, which together with the selling program started to move the prices downwards. The 
authors note that the high trading amounts of High Frequency Traders may act as a signal of 
liquidity to Fundamental Traders. This notion was also made by Zhang (2010), as discussed in 
Section 3.2. Given that the Fundamental Traders observe liquidity incorrectly, they may engage in a 
buying/selling order that exceeds the actual liquidity in the markets and thus has significant price 
impact. In this view, the existence of High Frequency Traders can amplify price volatility.  
3.4. Jarrow and Protter (2011) 
Jarrow and Protter (2011) construct a model of high frequency trading which suggests that high 
frequency trading may not increase the efficiency of electronic markets. The model allows high 
frequency traders to create increased volatility and mispricing that they exploit to their advantage. 
This result is contrary to the belief that high frequency traders act as arbitrageurs who eliminate 
mispricing and increase the effectiveness of the equity markets. 
The authors note that their model allows for a self-induced mispricing because of downward sloping 
demand curves and differences in speed of transacting across traders. The model assumes that the 
markets are perfect, e.g. there are no bid/ask spreads and there is unlimited liquidity. Further, the 
authors model the price process as completely exogenous so that all traders act as price takers 
believing that their actions do not affect the price. Their model includes two kinds of traders, 
ordinary traders and high frequency traders, with different speeds of transacting.  
The high frequency traders, with their speed advantage, can react to price changes which they 
account to either firm fundamental news or mispricing. The ordinary traders also observe the signal, 
but can only act upon it after the high frequency traders because of unspecified constraints in their 
transacting speed. The model assumes a representative high frequency trader, e.g. all high 
frequency traders act similarly upon seeing a market signal. Thus, they collectively act like a single 
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large trader. And since demand curves are downward sloping, the actions of the collective unit have 
a market impact. The authors stress the point that an individual high frequency trader still considers 
itself a price taker and do not take into account the price impact of its own trades.  
The model of Jarrow and Protter formally models the process of front-running, where the high 
frequency trader generates a very large amount of orders to learn the trading strategy of the ordinary 
investor and then uses its speed advantage to trade ahead of him. The authors note that in their 
model, there exists a shift of wealth from ordinary traders to high frequency traders, no matter how 
clever the ordinary trader is. Their model, which includes many simplifying assumptions, gives 
backing to the opponents of high frequency trading who see it as distorting equality in the market 
place as high frequency traders are able to extract surplus from other investors. 
3.5. Cartea and Penalva (2010) 
Cartea and Penalva (2010) analyze high frequency trading by developing a model with three types 
of traders: (1) liquidity traders, (2) market makers, and (3) high frequency traders. In their model, 
liquidity traders come to the market to liquidate their positions which are then temporarily held by 
the market makers for a liquidity premium. The high frequency traders have the ability to process 
information faster than the other participants, and thus can act as intermediaries between liquidity 
traders and market makers, deteriorating the terms of trade for the liquidity trader.  
The authors provide stylized examples of the trading strategies and profit making opportunities of 
high frequency traders. These examples are simple, yet backed by the model of Cartea and Penalva 
(2010), so as to give a realistic and intuitive idea of how high frequency traders might interact with 
other traders in the equity markets.  
Suppose a liquidity trader who wants to liquidate a large block of shares. To minimize price impact, 
she divides the block into smaller pieces and starts selling them. As the first pieces enter the market 
operator’s system, the high frequency trader learns the liquidity trader’s intentions. The high 
frequency trader then cancels her outstanding buy orders and posts additional sell orders to increase 
sell pressure, so as to clear the remaining buy orders at the current bid price. After that, the high 
frequency trader, by using its speed advantage, posts a large amount of buy orders at a lower bid 
price ahead of the market maker, who also reacts to the situation, albeit much slower. Given that the 
liquidity trader still continues the selling program, she faces lower prices and unloads the rest of the 
block to the high frequency trader. After seeing a drop in supply from the liquidity trader, the high 
frequency trader cancels its remaining buy orders and simultaneously post sell orders with 
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marginally higher price to offload its long position. The market maker reacts to these orders, which 
are still under the initial market prices so that it too generates profits.  
The authors propose a model where equity markets create social values by allowing financing of 
economic activity and allowing shareholders to convert their holdings into cash quickly at a 
reasonable cost. In this setting, market makers acts as counterparties to investors with trading needs, 
and are willing to hold on to securities until another investor enters the market. To compensate for 
the risks included in market-making, the market makers earns the bid/ask spread. As mentioned 
earlier, high frequency traders are introduced in the model, and due to their speed advantage, can 
extract part of the trading surplus between liquidity investors and market makers.  
Their model consists of three time periods, ݐ = 1,2,3 and two liquidity traders, ܮ1 and ܮ2. ܮ1 wants 
to sell ݅assets at period 1, while ܮ2 wants to buy ݅ assets at period 2. There are also ܯ 
intermediaries, or market makers, who accept ܮͳԢݏ trade in period 1 and hold on to the asset until 
ܮʹԢݏ trade in period 2. The asset has price risk as public information about period 3 enters market at 
periods 1 and 2. Thus, the market maker faces risks when holding on to the asset between periods 1 
and 2 and market prices will adjust to take that risk into account. The authors include a single 
monopolistic high frequency trader in the market. They note that high frequency traders can be 
expected to possess significant monopoly power since entry to the market is limited by high 
investment costs with respect to co-location services, hardware, and access to algorithms and data.  
The high frequency trader is able to generate profits by observing an increase in the supply/demand 
that arises from the liquidity traders trading needs. In the model, the high frequency trader is able to 
impose a haircut to the price of the security, e.g. the high frequency trader is able to deteriorate the 
terms of trade of the liquidity trader. For example, if the liquidity trader engages in a large sell 
operation, the high frequency trader manages to front-run the liquidity trader and reduces the 
average execution price of the sell operation. Subsequently, the high frequency trader accumulates 
long positions in the security which it wants to liquidate to end up with zero inventory. According 
to the paper, the haircut imposed by the high frequency trader is proportional to the size of the trade 
of the liquidity trader. This result might be driven by the ability of high frequency traders to only 
discriminate between orders of different sizes, not between different traders.   
The model suggests that the introduction of a high frequency trader doubles the number of trades 
and that the high frequency trader is able to capture 50 per cent of the rebates offered by the market 
operator, given that rebates are offered. The authors highlight that the additional trade volume 
generated by the high frequency trader is not driven by fundamentals, but is rather a consequence of 
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tailor made trades that extract surplus from liquidity traders. While high frequency traders are able 
to extract surplus from liquidity traders, the net wealth effect for market makers is zero. This 
implies that liquidity traders bear the costs for the change in market structure as they are the ones 
whose net wealth is reduced by allowing high frequency traders in the model. From a social point of 
view, the paper suggests that high frequency trading hinders the effectiveness of the market place 
by deteriorating the terms with which investors and convert their equities into cash (and vice versa) 
3.6. Brogaard (2011b) 
Brogaard (2011b) examines the role of high frequency trading in the U.S. equity markets by 
analyzing (1) trading and quote activity of high frequency traders, (2) the drivers behind the trading 
activity, (3) the profitability of high frequency trading, and (4) its trading characteristics. The paper 
uses data from both NASDAQ and BATS exchanges with time stamped trades for 120 stocks in 
2008, 2009 and partly 2010. The author notes that the exchanges have identified the groups of firms 
that are classified as high frequency traders, of which there are 26 in NASDAQ and 25 in BATS. It 
is worth noting that the exact grounds on which the exchanges identified the high frequency traders 
remain unknown. Also, it is reasonable to assume that the criteria by which the high frequency 
traders were selected differ between the two exchanges, which could impose limitations to the 
study. 
With respect to trading activity, Brogaard reports that in the sample, high frequency traders are 
involved in 68.49% of all dollar volume activity in NASDAQ, with a range from 60.44% to 
75.85%. The activity is divided between liquidity supply and demand so that the high frequency 
traders demand liquidity in 42.74% of dollar volume activity and supply it in 41.12%. This result 
seems to contrast the notion that high frequency traders are mainly suppliers of liquidity and engage 
in market-making activities. Brogaard notes that the activity of high frequency traders rises in 
proportion to the market capitalization of the stock in question. This finding seems to hold in all 
existing studies on high frequency trading, and it raises the question why high frequency traders are 
active in the most liquid stocks if their contribution to the market is to provide liquidity. 
With respect to intra-day changes in trading activity, the paper suggests that high frequency traders 
are active for most of the trading day, except for the first and last 10-minute periods of the day. 
Brogaard also analyzes the role of high frequency traders by looking at the fraction of the day the 
high frequency traders provide the inside bid or offer for a stock. The results suggest that the 
fraction of the time increases with stock size, which implies that high frequency traders compete 
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harder for the large and liquid stocks. The paper reports that high frequency traders match or beat 
the best bid and offer quotes 65.04% of the time. This finding suggests, and credits the proponents 
of high frequency trading, that the existence of high frequency traders reduces bid-ask spreads.  
Brogaard studies the short-term determinants of high frequency trading with a linear probability 
regression. The dependent variables in the regressions are the following choices for a high 
frequency trader: (1) buy, (2) buy and supply liquidity, (3) buy and demand liquidity, (4) sell, (5) 
sell and supply liquidity, and (6) sell and demand liquidity. The explanatory variables are (1) the 
return of the stock in the previous period (10-second), (2) average time-weighted spread, (3) 
average best bid depth, (4) the number of shares traded, and (5) the order imbalance. The author 
uses lagged variables as well as contemporaneous values for the regression in order to identify 
specific trading strategies, such as momentum strategy, price reversal strategy or spread-premium 
strategy.  
The results of Brogaard’s regressions suggest that high frequency traders engage in price reversal 
strategy where past stock returns increase the probability that the high frequency traders sells. The 
author also finds that the trading activity of high frequency traders is generally momentum 
enhancing, as high frequency traders are more likely to buy when there exists a buy order 
imbalance. Brogaard also reports that high frequency traders are able to systematically anticipate 
and trade ahead of non-high frequency traders, but the results are statistically significant only for 
buy trades. The author notes that anticipatory ability could be explained by the fact that high 
frequency traders can algorithmically analyze market events and thus reacts faster than other market 
participants. Alternatively, the author suggests that the reason could be that high frequency traders 
can observe order book patterns arising from institutional investors’ buy and sell programs. 
3.7. Brogaard (2011a) 
Brogaard (2011a) analyzes the impact of high frequency trading on volatility by looking at high 
frequency trading activity around company news announcements. The data sample used in the paper 
is from 2008-2009, a period which featured elevated levels of volatility. It allows the author to 
identify if a high frequency trader was involved in a particular trade and whether it supplied or 
demanded liquidity. Brogaard analyzes the relationship between high frequency trading activity and 
volatility, and runs a causality test using a Granger test. A Granger test is a statistical test for 
determining if a time series is useful in predicting another.  
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The author first looks at the relationship between high frequency trading and volatility, without 
paying attention to matters of causality. The results of the empirical analysis suggest that high 
frequency trading activity varies significantly as volatility changes and that the direction of the 
change depends of the type of high frequency activity. For short time intervals, an increase in 
volatility increases the supply activity of high frequency traders but decreases their demand activity. 
For longer time intervals, on the other hand, both supply and demand activity decrease as volatility 
increases.  
After the author has established a relationship between volatility and high frequency trading 
activity, he continues to explore the causality. He computes the Granger causality test both ways, 
the hypotheses being that (1) changes in high frequency trading activity Granger cause changes in 
volatility, and that (2) changes in volatility Granger cause changes in high frequency trading 
activity. Variable X is said to Granger cause variable Y if (controlling for relevant variables and 
lagged variables for Y) lagged variables of X improve the prediction of the current value of Y. 
Brogaard notes that while Granger causality test alone cannot determine whether buying and selling 
activities of high frequency traders cause volatility, it is a necessary condition for a causal relation 
between the two variables.  
Brogaard uses a two-equation model to compute the Granger test. He controls for implied volatility 
through VIX-index, the log of market capitalization, market-to-book ratio, dollar volume of trades 
during the day for a given stock, average quote depth for the inside bid and ask, and average time-
weighted dollar bid-ask spread. He reports that the results of the regressions strongly suggest 
Granger causality in both directions, e.g. that high frequency trading activity influences volatility, 
and that volatility influences high frequency trading activity. The author notes that while there is a 
strong causality in general, the null hypothesis for the Granger test cannot be rejected for small 
stocks and for the longest time intervals (one day). That the influence of high frequency trading on 
volatility for small stocks is statistically insignificant is very interesting. Intuitively it would seem 
likely that high frequency trading could amplify price volatility more strongly in the domain of 
small stocks since they generally exhibit less liquidity, which implies more price impact for trades.  
To further examine the causality between high frequency trading and volatility, the author uses a 
natural experiment to study how changes in high frequency trading activity influence volatility. The 
natural experiment here is an exogenous shock to high frequency trading activity, the short-sale ban 
of 799 financial stocks between September 19th and October 9th 2008. The author notes that short-
selling is a reasonable proxy for high frequency trading since the correlation between the two is 
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about 22 % in his sample. He continues that since high frequency traders in general want to keep 
zero net positions, they use short-selling to be able to quickly switch between long and short 
positions.  The author notes that the short-sale ban indirectly prevented some of the high frequency 
traders from trading in the banned stocks because their trading algorithms were not set up to handle 
this additional constraint.  
The author reports that the results of the natural experiment suggest a negative relationship between 
high frequency trading activity and intra-day volatility. This is based on the finding that his 
empirical tests suggest that a reduction in high frequency trading activity, with short-selling as 
proxy, was connected with an increase in intra-day realized volatility.  
3.8. Hasbrouck and Saar (2011) 
Hasbrouck and Saar (2011) study the “millisecond environment”, which refers to high frequency 
trading environment. Their data is from NASDAQ and includes the top 500 companies by market 
capitalization as of September 2007. The first sample period is from the last quarter of 2007. The 
authors note that during the sample period, the market was relatively stable and thus the data is 
intended to reflect a “normal” market environment. In addition, the authors include a second 
sample, from June 2008, which represents a period of heightened uncertainty.  
The authors calculate the intensity of limit order, market order, and cancellation arrivals to be 
53,200 messages per stock in 2007. However, they argue that the message intensity is highly 
periodic, and calculate a hazard-rate measure to capture it. The hazard-rate for a stock is the 
message arrival intensity, conditional on the time elapsed since the last message. The authors report 
hazard-rates of roughly hundred times the average message intensity for the first milliseconds after 
the preceding message. They also report that the high hazard-rates dissipate quickly, so that in 2008, 
the hazard rate drops by 90 percent from its maximum value after first ten milliseconds. The authors 
argue that steeply declining hazard rates are consistent with clustering, which refers to the finding 
that trading activity reflects variation in information intensity. For example, changes in analysts’ 
forecasts occur seldom and cause elevated levels of trading activity as market participants update 
their view of the company valuation. Notwithstanding, the authors argue that at time horizons of 
extreme brevity, market participants are only able to react to local market information, e.g. to 
information about whether someone is interested in buying or selling in the market.  
Hasbrouck and Saar also identify local peaks in the hazard rate data occurring at 60,100 and 1000 
ms. The authors argue that these peaks arise from algorithms that periodically access the markets. 
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They also find that the fastest responders to react to changes in the order book have reaction times 
of 2-3 ms. By carefully looking at the data, the authors report that the periodicity in the millisecond 
environment is caused by actions of two different kinds of algorithms. To be more specific, they 
identify algorithms that cycle in clock-time and algorithms that respond to market events. This 
implies that the two categories of algorithms can be divided into agency algorithms and proprietary 
algorithms, where agency algorithms refer to algorithms used by brokers of institutional investors, 
and proprietary algorithms refer to high frequency traders. The authors argue that most of the 
activity in the millisecond environment is caused by interaction between automated algorithms. 
These algorithms are designed to trigger a response from other algorithms or respond to their 
signals.  
To further analyze the millisecond environment, Hasbrouck and Saar develop a measure of strategic 
runs. Strategic runs are linked order submissions, cancellations and executions that are likely to be 
part of a dynamic strategy. A strategic run always starts with an order submission, and its 
subsequent cancellation. Then, a possible resubmission of a non-marketable limit order or a 
subsequent execution in the same direction with the same quantity is linked to the run if they occur 
within 100 milliseconds. The authors note that even though they allow 100 milliseconds to pass 
between messages, 49 percent of the durations between messages in the same run are zero ore one 
milliseconds. They report that roughly 58 percent of cancellations are part of strategic runs for 2007 
data, and 53 percent for 2008 data. The length of a strategic run can be measured by the number of 
messages, and the authors identify runs with length up to 93,244 messages. 
Hasbrouck and Saar use the strategic runs as a proxy for high frequency trading and analyze its 
impact on market quality measures, such as spread, order book depth, and short-term volatility. The 
authors report that an increase in high frequency trading activity is associated with lower spreads, 
greater order book depth and lower short-term volatility. The authors note that the magnitude of 
improvement in the market quality was larger for 2008 data, from which they gather that high 
frequency trading activity creates a positive externality to markets at the time the markets need it 
the most. They also report that low-latency activity helps reduce volatility to a greater extent in 
smaller stocks during 2008, but for 2007 data there is no visible difference between small and large 
stocks.     
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3.9. Cont et al. (2008) 
Cont et al. (2008) develop a stochastic model for order book dynamics. A stochastic model is a tool 
for estimating probability distributions of possible outcomes by allowing for random variation in 
one or more inputs over time. Their model treats an order book as a continuous-time Markov 
process that tracks the number of limit orders at each price level in the book. A Markov process 
denotes a stochastic process which satisfies the Markov property, or condition of memorylessnes, 
which dictates that the next state of the process depends only on the present state. In other words, 
conditional on the present state of the system, its future and past are independent. 
Consider a market for a financial instrument where market participants can post two types of orders, 
limit orders and market orders. A limit order is an order to trade a certain amount of a security at a 
given price, while a market order is an order to trade a certain quantity of a security at the best 
available price in the order book. Limit orders are posted to the electronic trading system, where 
they are compiled into a limit order book, which tracks the quantities of limit orders at each price 
level. The lowest price for which there exists a limit sell order is called the ask price and the highest 
buy price is called the bid price. When a market order arrives in the system, it is matched with the 
best available limit order and a trade occurs, after which the limit order book is updated 
accordingly. A limit order is kept in the limit order book until it is matched with a market order or 
cancelled.  
In the model, limit orders are placed on a price grid {1,…,n} representing multiples of a price tick, 
where the upper boundary n is chosen large enough so that it is highly unlikely that orders for the 
stock in question are priced higher than n within the time frame of the analysis. The state of the 
order book is tracked by a continuous-time process        01 ,..., t{ tn tXtXtX  where  tX p  is the 
number of outstanding limit orders at price npp dd1, . If   0tX p , then there are  tX p  bid 
orders at price p. If   0!tX p , then there are  tX p  ask orders at price p. 
The ask price  tpA is defined as  
   ^ `0,,...,1inf !  tXnptp pA .  
Similarly, the bid price  tpB is defined as 
   ^ `0,,...,1sup   tXnptp pB . 
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The mid-price  tpM and the bid-ask spread  tpS are defined by 
     
2
tptptp ABM
 and      tptptp BAS   
The number of outstanding bid orders at a distance i from the ask is defined as  
ܳ௜
஻(ݐ) = ܺ௣ಲ(௧)ି௜(ݐ),where0 < ݅ < ݌஺(ݐ). 
Similarly, the number of outstanding ask orders at a distance i from the bid is defined as 
 ܳ௜஺(ݐ) = ܺ௣ಳ(௧)ା௜(ݐ),where0 < ݅ < ݊ െ ݌஻(ݐ). 
The dynamics of the order book are driven by the incoming flow of limit orders, market orders and 
cancellations at each price level. When one of these events occur, one of the following must hold 
true: 
x a limit buy order at price level ݌ < ݌஺(ݐ) increases the quantity at level p 
x a limit sell order at price level ݌ > ݌஻(ݐ) increases the quantity at level p 
x a market buy order decreases the quantity at the ask price 
x a market sell order decreases the quantity at the bid price 
x a cancellation of an outstanding limit buy order at price level ݌ < ݌஺(ݐ) decreases the 
quantity at level p 
x a cancellation of an outstanding limit sell order at price level ݌ > ݌஻(ݐ) decreases the 
quantity at level p 
Bouchaud et al. (2002) study the statistical properties of limit order books and suggest that the 
distribution of incoming limit orders at the bid (or ask) follows a Gamma distribution. The authors 
report that the price at which new limit orders are placed is broadly distributed around the current 
bid/ask and that the average order book has a maximum away from the current bid/ask, and a tail 
reflecting the statistics of the incoming orders.  
Motivated by this finding, the model in this paper used a stochastic model where the above events 
are modeled using independent Poisson processes. A Poisson process is a stochastic process in 
which events occur continuously and independently of one other. The probability distribution of the 
waiting time until the next occurrence in the Poisson process is an exponential distribution. More 
precisely, the model assumes that 
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x limit buy (and sell) orders arrive at a distance of i ticks from the best quote at independent 
exponential times with rate ߣ(݅) 
x market buy (and sell) orders arrive at independent exponential rate ߤ  
x Cancellations of limit orders at a distance of i ticks from the best quote occur at a rate 
proportional to the number of outstanding orders. If the number of outstanding orders at that 
level is x, then the cancellation rate is ߠ(݅)ݔ 
Order arrival rates are modeled to depend on the distance to the bid/ask so that most orders are 
being placed close to the current best price. Based on the finding of Bouchaud et al. (2002), the rate 
is modeled as a power law 
ߣ(݅) = ௞
௜ೌ
. 
Given the above assumptions, X is a continuous-time Markov process with state space Ժ௡  and the 
following transition rates: 
x xื ݔ௣ିଵ with rate ߣ(݌஺(ݐ) െ ݌)for݌ < ݌஺(ݐ) 
x xื ݔ௣ାଵ with rate ߣ൫݌ െ ݌஻(ݐ)൯for݌ > ݌஻(ݐ) 
x xื ݔ௣ಳ(௧)ାଵ with rate ߤ 
x xื ݔ௣ಲ(௧)ିଵ with rate ߤ 
x xื ݔ௣ିଵ with rate ߠ(݌஺(ݐ) െ ݌)หݔ௣หfor݌ < ݌஺(ݐ) 
x xื ݔ௣ାଵ with rate ߠ൫݌ െ ݌஻(ݐ)൯หݔ௣หfor݌ > ݌஻(ݐ) 
The limit order and cancellation arrival rates ߣ(݅) and ߠ(݅)ݔ are used in this study to examine the 
dynamics of the order generation and cancellation activity of high frequency traders.  
 
    
37 
 
4 Data and methods 
This chapter describes the data used in this study and the market place from which the data are 
acquired. This chapter also explains how a limit order book is constructed from raw limit order data. 
In addition, this chapter uses a number of measures to identify high frequency traders from the data 
in order to assess their role in NASDAQ OMX Nordic Exchange Helsinki. The measures are linked 
to the formal definition given in Section 2.1 to clear any potential confusion about findings of this 
study with respect to their tractability. As discussed in Chapter 3, many previous studies on the 
effects of high frequency trading use data where high frequency traders are flagged by the data 
provider, which leave the authors little room to discuss the actual conecpts of high frequency 
trading.  
The data used in this study is order level data from NASDAQ OMX Nordic Exchange Helsinki. It 
includes all limit orders, cancellations and market orders for five liquid stocks for the period of 22nd 
– 26th November 2010. The stocks in the data are Nokia Corporation, UMP-Kymmene Corporation, 
Sampo PLC A, Fortum Corporation and Stora Enso Oyj R. Previous literature has identified that 
high frequency traders are most active in large and liquid stocks, which suggests limitations to this 
study as the data is not a representative sample of stocks in NASDAQ OMX Nordic Exchange 
Helsinki. Instead, the results of this study can be interpreted as an upper limit for high frequency 
trading in the market place. 
4.1. Overview of NASDAQ OMX Nordic Exchange Helsinki 
NASDAQ OMX Nordic Exchange Helsinki, commonly referred to as Helsinki Stock exchange, is 
the primary equity market place in Finland. The stock exchange, which was first established in 
1912, has operated under several different owners. The exchange merged with its Swedish 
counterpart to form OMX AB in 2003, which was subsequently acquired by NASDAQ in February 
2008. In addition to Helsinki, NASDAQ OMX Nordic Exchange operates exchanges in Stockholm, 
Oslo, Copenhagen, Reykjavik, Tallinn, Riga and Vilnus.  
Trading volume in NASDAQ OMX Nordic Exchange Helsinki has increased in recent years due to 
increased activity in algorithmic and high frequency trading, and the average number of trades in 
2011 was 85 259 trades per day, an increase of nearly 40 per cent from the previous year. While the 
number of trades has increased dramatically, the average size of a trade has been declining. The 
average size of a trade was 6 589 € in 2011, which was over 25 per cent lower than in 2010. Both of 
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these developments are what one could expect to be a result from increased algorithmic, and 
especially, high frequency trading.  
The average daily Euro volume for the 131 listed stocks in the exchange was 547 million Euros for 
2011, which was roughly one percent less than in 2010. The five most traded stocks in 2011 were 
the same as in 2010; Nokia, UPM-Kymmene, Fortum, Stora Enso, and Sampo. Data from these 
stocks are also used in this study. The stock exchange currently conducts trading with 65 member 
institutions who have access to the trading platform. The member institutions can provide their 
access to third party traders, so the actual number of active trading institutions can be substantially 
larger.      
4.2. Limit order data and order book mechanics 
This section describes the components of the limit order data and the basic underlying mechanisms 
behind electronic order driven equity markets.  
Orders are messages sent to the market operator’s system that specify a security the trader wants to 
trade, whether he wants to buy or sell, how much he wants to trade, and with what price. Orders are 
the fundamental building blocks of electronic markets where the orders are stored in a limit order 
book and arranged into trades by price-time priority. The prices with which buy and sell orders 
arrive are called bid and ask prices, and the best standing bid and ask prices in the order book are 
referred to as inside prices, market bid and market ask, market quotations, or simply just bid and 
ask. The difference between the best bid and ask prices is called the bid-ask spread, which is 
considered one of the fundamental indicators of market quality. Small bid-ask spreads indicate that 
the price with which you can buy a share is close to the price at which you can sell one. Sometimes 
market participants want to refer to the current market price with one number, without 
differentiating between buying and selling. To capture this, the midpirce gives the arithmetic mean 
of the market bid and ask prices. 
Generally, there are two types of orders with respect to the price the trader is willing to accept. A 
limit order is an order to buy or sell a stock at a specific price or better. A buy limit order can only 
be executed at the limit price or lower, and a sell limit order can be executed at the limit price or 
higher. These orders do not guarantee execution but are stored in the order book as standing orders 
if not executed immediately upon arrival. A market order on the other hand is an order to buy or sell 
a stock at the best available price. Market orders are executed immediately against standing orders 
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in the order book. The price at which a market order is executed is not guaranteed but depends on 
the current state of the order book.        
An order supplies liquidity to the order book if it is recorded as a standing order in the order book 
and gives other traders and opportunity to trade. Conversely, an order demands liquidity if it is 
immediately matched with a standing order in the order book and thus removes this order from the 
order book. All market orders demand liquidity since they are immediately executed against a 
standing limit order in the order book, but limit orders can supply or demand liquidity, depending 
on the price at which they are submitted. A limit order which is executed immediately is called a 
marketable limit order. Since the data used in this thesis does not allow classifying between market 
orders and marketable limit orders, they are both considered market orders.  
When a limit order arrives to the market system, it is recorded as a standing order in the order book 
and stays there until one of the following events occur: (1) the standing order is executed against an 
incoming market order or marketable limit order, (2) the order is canceled, or (3) the order reaches 
its maximum time of validity. Cancellation of a limit order can occur either for the whole 
outstanding amount or for a part of the amount. If an order is cancelled partially, the remaining part 
of the order stays in the order book with the same order information. In modern equities markets 
with high frequency traders, most orders are cancelled before they are executed or before they reach 
their maximum duration. In markets where high frequency traders participate actively, the average 
duration of an order can be extremely short since the high frequency traders are able to update their 
orders in a fraction of a second.     
4.2.1. Limit order data 
Table 1 gives an example of the limit order data. For any given limit order that enters the system, 
the data gives the name of the security, the date and timestamp. The timestamp value of mstime is 
given as nanoseconds after midnight. The variables ordersequence and mykey are reference 
numbers that are used to track orders in the order book. Side tells if the order is a limit buy or limit 
sell order, quantity gives the number of shares, and price is the price in one hundredth of a Euro 
cent. Userid (information hidden in the table due to data confidentiality) gives the trading account 
that generated the limit order.  
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Table 1: Example of the limit order data 
4.2.2. Cancellation and execution data 
Table 2 gives an example of the cancellation data. The variables of the table contain information 
similar to those of limit orders. Any limit order in the order book can be canceled any time by the 
market participant who inserted the order. The reference numbers ordersequence and mykey are 
used to match a cancellation with its respective limit order to track changes in the order book.  The 
matching allows computation of many interesting variables, such as the time the order stayed in the 
order book and the side and price of the initial limit order, which are not revealed by the 
cancellation data alone.  
 
Table 2: Example of the cancellation data 
name_long_cur refdate ordersequence mykey mstime side userid quantity price
Nokia Corporation 25NOV2010 87435 169656 32402189000000 B x 500 72150
Nokia Corporation 25NOV2010 87437 169663 32402215000000 B x 800 72100
UPM-Kymmene Corporation 25NOV2010 87450 169710 32402287000000 B x 179 117500
UPM-Kymmene Corporation 25NOV2010 87589 169956 32402555000000 B x 400 117500
Sampo Plc A 25NOV2010 87702 170160 32402767000000 S x 1000 194400
Nokia Corporation 25NOV2010 87730 170234 32402853000000 S x 1000 72600
Fortum Corporation 25NOV2010 87896 170568 32403211000000 S x 100 214700
Fortum Corporation 25NOV2010 87897 170569 32403211000000 B x 100 173800
Nokia Corporation 25NOV2010 87990 170781 32403396000000 B x 5000 72300
name_long_cur refdate ordersequence mykey mstime quantity userid
Sampo Plc A 25NOV2010 579120 1347041 33440000000000 331 x
Fortum Corporation 24NOV2010 579128 1264820 32950000000000 3733 x
Nokia Corporation 25NOV2010 579139 1250766 33360000000000 2787 x
Nokia Corporation 24NOV2010 579184 1246176 32930000000000 492 x
UPM-Kymmene Corporation 22NOV2010 579218 1442353 33360000000000 5610 x
UPM-Kymmene Corporation 22NOV2010 579220 1389183 33310000000000 5041 x
Nokia Corporation 22NOV2010 579223 1272534 33220000000000 3599 x
Fortum Corporation 24NOV2010 579249 1272263 32960000000000 500 x
UPM-Kymmene Corporation 25NOV2010 579272 1770437 33760000000000 1267 x
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In addition to limit order and cancellation data, the data used in the study consists of information 
about the executions that took place during the sample period. Table 3 gives an example of the 
execution data, which contains information about each individual execution in the same manner as 
the data of limit orders and cancellations. In a similar fashion to cancellations, the reference 
variables ordersequence and mykey allow matching the executions with their respective limit 
orders.  
 
Table 3: Example of the execution data 
 
Table 4 lists the average daily number of limit orders, cancellations and executions in each security 
as a reference of their trading activity. The number of cancellations may exceed the number of 
inserted limit orders due to partial cancellations.  
 
Table 4: Average daily limit orders, cancellations and executions 
4.3. Order book compilation 
This section describes the methods used to compile a representative limit order book from the order 
flow data. 
name_long_cur refdate ordersequence mstime mykey quantity userid price
Nokia Corporation 26NOV2010 92502 32410599000000 213744 1257 x 72800
Sampo Plc A 25NOV2010 92609 32433217000000 223784 180 x 194800
Stora Enso Oyj R 25NOV2010 92612 32406542000000 181496 1700 x 68000
Fortum Corporation 26NOV2010 92799 32401328000000 182294 736 x 211600
Fortum Corporation 26NOV2010 92799 32401328000000 182291 100 x 211600
Fortum Corporation 26NOV2010 92799 32401328000000 182297 70 x 211600
Fortum Corporation 26NOV2010 92799 32401328000000 182285 100 x 211600
Fortum Corporation 26NOV2010 92799 32401328000000 182288 55 x 211600
Sampo Plc A 26NOV2010 93059 32401584000000 182832 2308 x 194900
Symbol Name Limit orders Cancellations Executions
24271 Fortum Corporation 19 148 18 831 6 414
24311 Nokia Corporation 198 971 279 244 19 197
24346 Sampo Plc A 36 251 39 048 5 769
24360 Stora Enso Oyj R 165 099 245 734 9 262
24386 UPM-Kymmene Corporation 37 397 41 850 5 688
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First, cancellations are matched with their respective limit orders within each trading day and 
security. This allows observing in which domain, with respect to buy and sell sides, a cancellation 
occurs. Also, the pairing allows comparing the time labels of the cancellation and its respective 
order, which gives the exact time the order stayed in the order book. Second, executions are 
matched with limit orders to identify and label market sell orders from market buy orders. Third, 
tables of limit orders, cancellations and market orders are merged and sorted on the basis of 
timestamp to construct the order book in a chronological manner. Observations are analyzed 
individually and in each row of the merged table, one of the following can happen: 
x An incoming buy limit order ܫ௣஻ increases the bid quote depth at price ݌. 
x An incoming sell limit order ܫ௣ௌ increases the ask quote depth at price ݌. 
x An incoming buy order cancellation ܥ௣஻ decreases the bid quote depth at price ݌. 
x An incoming sell order cancellation ܥ௣ௌ decreases the ask quote depth at price ݌. 
x An incoming market buy order ܯ஻decreases the ask quote depth at ask price ݌஺ௌ௄  
x An incoming market sell order ܯௌdecreases the bid quote depth at bid price ݌஻ூ஽ 
After an observation is classified to the above states, the variables ݌஺ௌ௄ , ݌஻ூ஽and ݌ெூ஽are updated 
accordingly. This process is done for each observation in the data, and it captures the underlying 
dynamics of the order book.  
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Graph 2: Order book snapshot, Fortum 22nd November 11:53:22 
Graph 2 illustrates the limit order book by giving a snapshot of the order book of Fortum PLC at 
11:53:22 November 22nd. The graph plots buy and sell quotes at 10 best prices, respectively. In this 
particular example, the pressure seems to be on the sell side as the quote depth at the best sell prices 
clearly outnumbers the quote depth at the best buy prices. In fact, looking forward in the data 
reveals that the mid-price is about to decrease after a market sell order removes the existing quote 
depth at the bid price.  
4.4. Order flow imbalance 
This section discusses the concept of order flow imbalance and explains how it is calculated in this 
study. Cont et al. (2011) argue that the price dynamics of order book events – limit orders, market 
orders and cancellations- can be modeled through a single variable, order flow imbalance (OFI). 
The order flow imbalance represents the net order flow in a given security, and tracks changes in 
the bid and ask quote depths. The variable treats a market sell order and a buy order cancellation 
(occurring at bid price) as identical events since both reduce the bid quote depth. The authors report 
that the order flow imbalance explains changes in mid-price in the short-term for a large sample of 
stocks. The authors dub the slope of the reaction as the price impact coefficient, which they show to 
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be inversely proportional to the order book depth. This implies that an incoming order has stronger 
price impact when the order book depth is low, which seems intuitive given that low order book 
depth implies less liquidity.  
The authors calculate the order flow imbalance by looking at limit orders sitting at the inside prices, 
e.g. the best bid and ask prices. The construction consists of the bid price ܲ஻, the size of the bid 
queue ݍ஻, the ask price ܲௌ, and the size of the ask queue ݍௌ. The bid price and the size of the bid 
queue represent the demand for the security, while the ask price and the size of the ask queue 
represent the supply. 
 
Graph 3: Illustration of order flow imbalance 
The order flow imbalance measure of Cont et al. (2011) looks at the best bid and ask prices, and 
thus every incoming order either increases or decreases the demand, or then increases or decreases 
the supply. The authors calculate the contribution of every individual event to the supply and 
demand of the security, and then define the order flow imbalance as: 
ܱܨܫ௞ = ෍ ݁௡ே(௧ೖ)
௡ୀே(௧ೖషభ)ାଵ  
 
where ܰ(ݐ௞ିଵ) + 1 and ܰ(ݐ௞) are the index of the first and the last event in the interval ሾݐ௞ିଵǡ ݐ௞, 
and ݁௡ is the contribution of message ݊ to the order flow imbalance.  
Bid price Pb Ask price Pa
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The order flow imbalance measure used in this study follows the construction of Cont et al. (2011) 
but expands the scope of the measure by looking beyond the best bid and ask prices. This is 
motivated by the distribution of orders in a limit order book. The distribution is shown to have a 
peak away from the best bid/ask and a long tail (Cvitanic & Kirilenko, 2010, Potter & Bouchaud, 
2002). In other words, a major share of the incoming orders arrive at prices away from the best 
bid/ask. The same property is shown to apply in this study as well.  
The distribution of incoming limit orders can be explained with asymmetric investor patience. 
Zovko and Farmer (2002) argue that choosing a relative price (with respect to the current best 
bid/ask) of a limit order is a strategic decision with a tradeoff between patience and profit. They 
continue that an impatient investor will submit a limit order at or above (below) the best bid (ask) to 
secure a transaction. An investor with intermediate patience will submit an order somewhat away 
from the best bid/ask. This will not result in an immediate transaction, but the order has a high 
priority if the mid-price changes so that the order becomes marketable. Finally, the authors argue, 
that a very patient investor will submit an order with a price far away from the current bid/ask, 
which will potentially lead to a transaction with a very favorable price (compared to the price at the 
time the order was placed). Thus, Zovko and Farmer theorize that the wide distribution of limit 
orders imply, among other things, differences in investor patience.     
It is reasonable to assume that high frequency traders place a significant share of their orders away 
from the best bid/ask price. Therefore, expanding the order flow imbalance variable to measure 
quote sizes for a range of prices near the best bid/ask produces a better tool for measuring changes 
in supply and demand.   
The order flow measure is constructed as follows: 
x ݍ௜,௡ௌ  is the contribution of observation ݊ to the size of the ask queue at price ݅ away from the 
ask price 
x ݍ௜,௡஻  is the contribution of observation ݊ to the size of the bid queue at price ݅ away from the 
bid price 
x ܳ௜,௡ௌ = ܳ௜,௡ିଵௌ + ݍ௜,௡ௌ  is the cumulative size of the ask queue at price ݅ away from the ask 
price 
x ܳ௜,௡஻ = ܳ௜,௡ିଵ஻ + ݍ௜,௡஻  is the cumulative size of the bid queue at price ݅ away from the bid 
price 
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x ܳ௡,ோௌ = σ ொ೔,೙ೄ ௪೔ೃ೔సబσ ௪೔ೃ೔సబ  is the ݓ௜ weighted mean of the ask queue sizes at prices ݅ = [0,1,2 …ܴ] 
away from the best ask price at observation ݊, where ݓ௜ = ቀସହቁ௜ 
x ܳ௡,ோ஻ = σ ொ೔,೙ಳ ௪೔ೃ೔సబσ ௪೔ೃ೔సబ  is the ݓ௜ weighted mean of the bid queue sizes at prices ݅ = [0,1,2 …ܴ] 
away from the best bid price at observation ݊, where ݓ௜ = ቀସହቁ௜ 
The contributions of limit orders, market orders and cancellations to the variables ݍ௜,௡ௌ  and ݍ௜,௡஻  
follow the same logic as in Section 4.2. 
Finally, the order flow imbalance is calculated as: 
ܱܨܫ௡,ோ = ܳ௡,ோ஻ െܳ௡,ோௌ  
Note that if ܴ = 0 the order book imbalance metric reduces to that used in Cont et al. (2011) where 
only the queue sizes of the inner prices are examined.  
Graph 4 illustrates the order book imbalance for Fortum on November 22nd. The order flow 
imbalance variable is plotted on the vertical axis and the variable mstime on the horizontal axis. 
Negative OFI values represent situations where ܳ௡,ோௌ > ܳ௡,ோ஻  , which means that the weighted mean 
of the sell queues exceed the weighted mean of the bid queues. In this example, ܴ = 4, which 
means that the OFI takes into account five best prices for both bid and ask queues.  
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Graph 4: Order flow imbalance for Fortum, NOV22. R=4 
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5 Identifying high frequency trading accounts 
This section describes how high frequency trading accounts are identified from the data. The 
measures used to identify high frequency trading are linked to the definition of high frequency 
trading, which was discussed in Section 2.1. The exact definition of high frequency trading is 
restated for the sake of convenience. High frequency trading is defined as a subset of algorithmic 
trading where: (1) holding periods are extremely short, (2) a massive number of orders are 
generated and cancelled, (3) the purpose is to make instant profits, and (4) virtually no open 
position is carried at the end of the day. 
The data classifies trading accounts into algorithmic, routing accounts and personal accounts. From 
this classification, algorithmic and routing accounts stand as potential high frequency trading 
accounts. The following measures can be calculated in order to identify high frequency accounts: 
a) A trading account’s average duration of non-zero net position can be used as a proxy for (1) 
and (3) 
b) A trading account’s share of orders with respect to total daily limit orders can be used as a 
proxy for (2) 
c) Also, a trading account’s ratio of cancellations to limit orders posted by the account can be 
used as a proxy for (2) 
d) A trading account’s average daily accumulated net position can be used as a proxy for (4) 
e) A trading account’s response delay to order book events can be measured with hazard rates. 
The response delay can be used to estimate the latency of the trading account. 
Because the data used in this study does not allow the identification of trading accounts responsible 
for executions, measures a) and d) are only discussed in Sections 5.1 and 5.2, respectively. 
Measures b) and c) are computed in Section 5.3, and measure e) is computed in Section 5.5.  
5.1. Average duration of non-zero positions 
As stated earlier, limitations in the data withhold this study from calculating the average duration of 
non-zero positions, which could be used as a proxy for a trading account’s average holding period. 
While the actual calculations cannot be made, the general process of calculating the average 
duration of non-zero positions is discussed in this section. Although the average duration of non-
zero positions can be calculated in a number of ways, this study chooses a simple method that 
catches the underlying idea behind the measure. 
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Suppose a trading account participates in ܭ trades during a trading day. Suppose further that: 
ܭ = ௜ܶ஻ + ௜ܶௌ , where ௜ܶ஻ denotes the timestamp value of a buy trade and ௜ܶௌ for a sell trade, and ݅is 
the number of the trade.  
Then, the average duration of non-zero positions can be calculated as the average time passed since 
the last trade in the opposing direction that matches or exceeds the size of the newest trade.  
5.2. Accumulated net positions 
A ratio of the absolute value of accumulated net position and total trading volume can be calculated 
to capture the net position accumulation behavior of a trading account. High frequency trading 
accounts are expected to exhibit low ratios, and other trading accounts are expected to exhibit either 
high or low ratios. 
Accumulated net position can be calculated as ܰܧܱܶܲ ூܵ஽ = σ ܳ௜஻௡௜ୀଵ െ σ ܳ௝ௌ௡௝ୀଵ  , 
where ܳ௜஻ denotes quantity of shares bought in transaction ݅, and ܳ௝ௌ denotes quantity of shares sold 
in transaction ݆.  
Total trading volume is ܱܸܱܶܶܮூ஽ = σ ܳ௜஻௡௜ୀଵ + σ ܳ௝ௌ௠௝ୀଵ  
And the ratio of absolute accumulated net position and total trading volume is 
NETPOSRATIOூ஽ = |ܰܧܱܶܲ ூܵ஽|ܱܸܱܶܶܮூ஽  
5.3. Number of orders and cancellations 
As mentioned in Section 2.1, where the definition of high frequency trading is given, high 
frequency traders generate and cancel a large number of orders. Therefore, analyzing the number of 
limit orders generated and cancelled is a viable way to identify potential high frequency traders 
from the data. 
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Graph 5: Share of orders by trading ID for the entire data. 50 most active accounts 
Graph 5 plots the total numbers of orders posted by 50 most active trading IDs for the whole data 
sample. The active trading accounts are sorted by their  combined number of limit orders for the 
sample period. The data indicates that there exists one dominating player who posted over 700 000 
orders in the sample, which represents over 30 percent of total orders posted by all market 
participants. There are also three other trading IDs who posted over 5 percent of total orders, as well 
as nine other traders who posted over 1 percent of orders. The average amount of orders posted by a 
trading account is 6 398 orders for the sample period, while the median amount is only 48 orders. 
The large difference in the median and average amounts is caused by the handful of extremely 
active trading accounts. 
In addition to the number of orders generated, it is useful to assess how many of these orders are 
cancelled. The cancellation/order –ratio gives the share of cancellations to posted limit orders. 
Note that a cancellation can occur for a fraction of the outstanding order amount and thus need not 
cancel the whole outstanding order. This allows multiple cancellations per posted limit order and 
hence also cancellation/order –ratios of over 1. 
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Graph 6: Cancellation/Order ratios for all trading accounts in the data 
Graph 6 plots the cancellation/order –ratios for all trading accounts in the data. The accounts are 
sorted based on their limit order activity so that the leftmost account is the most active and the 
rightmost the least active. As in the previous graph, the activity of a trading account refers to its 
amount of combined limit orders for the whole sample data. The cancellation/order –ratios are more 
uniformly distributed than the posted limit orders but two noteworthy patterns can be seen in the 
data. First, the most active trading IDs seem to exhibit significantly higher ratios than the other 
participants and their ratios are generally close or over 1, which implies that most of their limit 
orders are cancelled. Second, many of the least active trading IDs exhibit ratios of 1, which is 
caused by their small trading activity (in the domain of under 5 orders for the whole period). 
 
5.4. Hazard rates 
This section computes hazard rates for the individual trading accounts. Hazard rate is the message 
arrival intensity for a given stock, conditional on the time elapsed since the previous message. The 
concept of hazard rate was introduced by Hasbrouck and Saar (2011), who found out that the 
distribution of hazard rates is rapidly declining in time. Hasbrouck and Saar (2011) calculate the 
hazard rate as follows: 
ܪܣܼܣܴܦ ൌ ݐ௡ െ ݐ௡ିଵ for ݊ = [2,3,4 …ܰ],where ݐ௡ denotes the timestamp value of message ݊. 
This study uses a modified concept of the Hasbrouck and Saar (2011) hazard rate. The data used in 
this study allows identification of individual trading accounts, which makes it possible to compute 
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the message arrival intensity conditional on the time elapsed since the previous message from 
another trading account.  The hazard rate is a tool for estimating the reaction time of market 
participants to changes in the order book. Calculating the time since the previous message from 
another trading account makes the hazard rate a better tool for estimating reaction times since high 
frequency traders often post multiple messages instantaneously or in a very short time span, which 
can create bias in the hazard rate estimator. Also, hazard rates of zero milliseconds are omitted for 
the same reasons as they represent simultaneousness and do not reflect reaction times.  
The hazard rate used in this study is calculated as follows: 
ܪܣܼܣܴܦ௡ ൌ ݐ௡ǡ௜ െ ݐ௡ିଵǡ௜ିଵ for ݊ = [2,3,4 …ܰ],where ݐ௡ǡ௜ denotes the timestamp value of message 
݊ of trading ID ݅, and ݅ െ 1 denotes an ID not equal to ݅. 
 
Graph 7: Distribution of hazard rates in milliseconds, 0-5000ms. 
Graph 7 plots the distribution of hazard rates for the sample period. The results derived here are 
similar to those of Hasbrouck and Saar (2011), who argue that hazard rates are declining in time 
since information intensity is also clustered and that trading intensity reflects changes in 
information. Keeping this in mind, the authors argue that with extremely low values, hazard rates do 
not reflect changes in information about firm fundamentals but about changes in market conditions. 
The data here suggests that hazard rates for the liquid stocks in NASDAQ OMX Nordic Exchange 
Helsinki are rapidly declining in the domain of under 200 milliseconds and declining modestly after 
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that. The fact that over 60 per cent of all hazard rates are under 100 milliseconds suggests that most 
of the order flow activity is based on high frequency traders who react to changes in the order book.  
 
Graph 8: Distribution of hazard rates in milliseconds, 0-100ms. 
Graph 8 plots the distribution of hazard rates in the domain of under 100 milliseconds. The hazard 
rates are rapidly declining in the domain of under 2 milliseconds, then slowly declining between 2 
milliseconds and 20 milliseconds, and then increasing from 20 to 26 milliseconds, and then 
declining rapidly again. This hump in the distribution raises interesting questions about the reaction 
times of high frequency traders. It is reasonable to question if hazard rates of fewer than 2 
milliseconds represent reaction times to order book events. Previous literature has reported reaction 
times as fast as 2-3 milliseconds (Hasbrouck & Saar 2011), but the extremely high proportion of 
hazard rates of under 2 milliseconds in the data raises the question if there are other factors driving 
down the hazard rates. 
One possible explanation for the hazard rate dilemma is that the dynamics of the order book are too 
periodic for the hazard rate to reliably estimate reaction times to order book events. Suppose that an 
incoming market sell order ܯ௡hits the trading system at time ݊ removing a portion of the bid quote 
depth. Suppose further that a large number of high frequency traders react to the change in the order 
book by cancelling and posting new limit orders at time ݊ ൅ ݔ, and that it takes time ݕ to execute 
the whole updating operation so that some of the messages hit the trading system at time  ݊ ൅ ݔ and 
some at time ݊ ൅ ݔ ൅ ݕ. If the volume of the message traffic arising from the updating operation is 
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sufficiently large, the hazard rate variable estimates ݕand not ݊ ൅ ݔ, which represent the reaction 
time of high frequency traders. 
If the above hypothesis holds true, then the hump in figure 10 can be thought as representing ݊ ൅ ݔ, 
or the time it takes to react to market book changes, and the high proportion of hazard rates of under 
2 milliseconds as representing ݕ, or the time it takes for the high frequency traders to collectively 
execute their updating operations. 
In order to identify high frequency traders, the mean hazard rate is calculated for each individual 
trading account. Graph 9 plots the median hazard rates for the 50 most active trading accounts. A 
number of the most active trading accounts exhibit strikingly low median hazard rates, well below 
10ms. Especially for the active trading accounts with a very high number of messages, a median 
hazard rate below 10ms stands as a reliable indicator for an ability to react to order book events 
extremely fast. 
 
Graph 9: Median hazard rates by trading account for 50 most active trading accounts 
5.5. Identified high frequency trading accounts in sample data 
This section constructs an identifier for a high frequency trader using the data derived in the earlier 
section. The identifier uses the following data points: (1) amount of orders generated, (2) 
cancellation-order ratio, and (3) individual hazard rates. 
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Ideally, the high frequency identifier would use the average duration of non-zero positions and the 
average accumulated net positions in addition to the above measures to refine the identification 
process. Due to data limitations, these measures are only discussed in this context. 
In order to use the data computed in the previous sections as criteria for labeling trading accounts as 
high frequency traders, arbitrary levels of those variables must be selected as cut-off values. As an 
arbitrary selection of the cut-off value can impose severe limitations to the results of this thesis, the 
level in each variable is chosen to be conservative enough to underestimate the amount of high 
frequency trading. To pass as a high frequency trading account, a trading account needs to: 
i. Post over 5 percent of total daily average shares in at least one security 
ii. Have a cancellation-order ratio of more than 95 per cent 
iii. Have a mean or median hazard rate of less than 500ms.  
Together these criteria produce six trading accounts that meet the definition of a high frequency 
trader without a question. Due to data confidentiality, these accounts are only referred to as 
identified high frequency traders in the rest of the study.  
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6 Findings and discussion 
This chapter presents the empirical findings of the paper in the following order. First, the degree of 
high frequency trading in Helsinki Stock Exchange is reported in Section 6.1. After, the findings 
concerning the order generation characteristics of the identified high frequency trading accounts are 
presented in Section 6.2. Section 6.3 reports the limit order and cancellation arrival rates for high 
frequency trading accounts. Section 6.4 investigates the dynamics of high frequency trading order 
flow and cancellation arrival rates, and finally Section 6.5 investigates the relationship between 
high frequency trading order flow and stock price change.  
6.1. The degree of high frequency trading in Helsinki Stock Exchange 
This section examines the degree of high frequency trading in Helsinki Stock Exchange by looking 
at the relative share of orders posted by identified high frequency traders. As the data does not 
allow tracking of trades by trading accounts, the share of orders is used as a proxy for the overall 
degree of high frequency trading. As high frequency trading strategies involve massive number of 
orders generated relative to actual trades, the share of orders posted by identified high frequency 
traders over-estimates the degree of high frequency trading in Helsinki Stock Exchange with respect 
to share of trading volumes. While this is a limitation to this study, studying pure order flow shares 
gives a reasonable estimate about the activity of high frequency traders.  Gerig and Michayluk 
(2010) show that an automated liquidity provider, a high frequency trader in other words, transacts 
the majority of order flow in modern equity markets. Thus, order flow measures can be used to 
estimate the overall high frequency trading activity in a market.  
Graph 10 gives the share of orders from identified high frequency trading accounts per stock in the 
sample data. The evidence suggests that high frequency trading is prominent in all of the stocks in 
the data sample, and that there exists significant variation across them. The difference between 
values for Stora Enso and Fortum is almost 40 percentage points, which suggests that high 
frequency traders are selective when it comes to choosing the securities in which they engage in 
their selected trading strategy. Given that the group of identified high frequency trading accounts 
only consists of a handful of trading accounts, the average number of orders generated by each of 
these accounts is high enough to assume that their primary trading strategy is electronic liquidity 
provisioning, or electronic market making in other words. It is also reasonable to assume that the 
high frequency trader identification of this study, which was conducted in a conservative manner so 
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as not to overestimate the role of high frequency trading, left a number of high frequency trading 
accounts unidentified. In this case the order generation share of high frequency traders would be 
even larger than depicted here.     
 
Graph 10: Share of orders by identified high frequency trading accounts 
Graph 11 plots the share of orders from identified high frequency trading accounts for each trading 
day in the sample. The data suggests that high frequency trading activity is relatively stable over a 
five-day interval. One possible reason for this is that the most common trading strategy employed 
by high frequency traders in the sample data is electronic liquidity provisioning, where the activity 
of high frequency traders is mostly affected by the overall trading turnover rather than by 
information asymmetries, which would promote generally stable shares of high frequency trading. 
And with algorithmic trading in general, one would not expect to see significant deviations in the 
share of order flow captured by these traders since the algorithms execute a well-defined trading 
strategy from day to day. Hypothetically, largest drivers for deviations in the order flow volume of 
high frequency traders employing an electronic liquidity provision strategy would be changes in the 
overall trade and order flow activity in the stock. Thus it can be assumed that high frequency 
trading creates an increase in the overall order flow volume since competing high frequency traders 
respond to order book events created by ever more frequent updates by the other high frequency 
traders. This process will naturally lead to an increased share of order flow captured by high 
frequency traders, as seen in the data here. 
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Graph 11:Share of orders by identified high frequency trading accounts 
Graph 12 plots the intra-day changes in high frequency trading activity. The share of high 
frequency orders are calculated for each 1-minute interval in a trading day and averaged within each 
stock. The trend in the time variation is examined by the following ordinary least squares 
regression: 
Regression (I) 
ݕ௜ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߚ௜݉݅݊ݑݐ݁ ൅ ߝ௜ 
 
Table 5 Results of regression (I)  
The results of Regression (I) suggest that the share of high frequency trading orders decreases as a 
trading day develops. The drop in the share during the last hours of trading is evident in all stocks 
Fortum Nokia Sampo Stora Enso UPM-Kymmene
_cons 0.4664682 0.6981645 0.5759803 0.8365865 0.6682677
minute -0.0001655 -0.0001585 -0.0001992 -0.0000911 -0.0001652
(0.0000318) (0.0000155) (0.0000238) (0.0000104) (0.0000212)
t -5.21 -10.24 -8.36 -8.79 -7.8
59 
 
studied while there is significant variation in the intensity of the declination. The declining share of 
high frequency trading suggests that these traders manage their inventories and reduce the 
aggressiveness of their trading algorithms in order to arrive to the end of the trading day with zero 
net positions. Given that one of the principal risks related to market making is the inventory risk, 
this finding further supports the hypothesis that these identified high frequency trading accounts 
mainly engage in electronic liquidity provisioning.  
 
Graph 12: Average share of high frequency orders during 1-minute intervals in trading day 
The findings suggest that a majority of the order flow in NASDAQ OMX Nordic Exchange 
Helsinki is generated by a handful of high frequency trading accounts identified in this study. While 
their activity may comprise of several trading strategies, the large amounts of orders generated by 
the high frequency traders and their declining order flow share as a trading day progresses make it 
reasonable to assume that at least one of the identified high frequency traders, and possible all of 
them, engage in the electronic liquidity provisioning strategy. 
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6.2. Order generation characteristics of identified high frequency trading accounts 
High frequency traders need to constantly update their buy and sell order portfolio in accordance 
with changes in the limit order book. The sophisticated algorithms used by high frequency traders, 
together with low-latency connections offered by co-location services, enable them to cancel and 
submit large amounts of orders within a very short time interval. To capture the periodicity in the 
order submission dynamics, message run variable is calculated for the sample data. The message 
run identifies an uninterrupted chain of order submissions and cancellations originated by one 
identified high frequency trader. While some of the message run chain are relatively long in terms 
of consecutive messages, in the context of high frequency trading data these actions happen almost 
instantaneously. Given that this study has identified multiple competing high frequency traders, 
discovering frequent message runs of more than 50 consecutive messages suggests that at least one 
of them can post and cancel orders practically instantaneously.  
 
Graph 13: Message runs against time (mstime) for the sample data 
Graph 13 plots message runs for the sample data against time where the value on the y-axis 
represents the length of the run. The frequent message runs with many of them exceeding 100 
consecutive messages suggests that the order submission dynamics of the high frequency traders is 
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highly periodic. High periodicity supports the hypothesis that high frequency traders capture the 
majority of order flow by engaging in electronic liquidity provision strategy in which they adjust 
their buy and sell orders constantly. The relatively large number of lengthy runs may also suggest 
asymmetries in the latencies of the different high frequency traders. Suppose that one of the 
identified high frequency traders has a lower latency than the others. In other words, it can either 
access the market infrastructure with less delay or has the ability to process market information 
faster. In this case that high frequency trader would be able to update its quote offering before the 
others and thus create long message runs.  
6.3. Limit order and cancellation arrival rates 
This section presents the limit order and cancellation arrival rates for identified high frequency 
traders. The arrival rates are used to study the order generation and cancellation characteristics of 
high frequency traders. The arrival rates are denoted as  
x ߣሙ(݅) for the arrival rate of limit orders with ݅ ticks away from the best quote. 
x ߠෘ(݅) for the arrival rate of cancellations with ݅ ticks away from the best quote. 
  
6.3.1. Limit order arrival rates 
The limit order arrival rate is calculated as 
ߣሙ(݅) = ே೗(௜)
்
 for Ͳ ൑ ݅ < 10, 
where ௟ܰ(݅) is the total number of limit orders that arrived at a distance (݅) from the best quote and  
ܶ is the total trading time in minutes. The arrival function captures both buy and sell limit orders so 
that a buy order 2 ticks below the current market bid price and a sell order 2 ticks above the current 
market ask price are recorded as same events.   
Table 5 lists the limit order arrival rates for identified high frequency traders by stocks for 
Ͳ ൒ ݅ < 10 ticks from the market bid/ask. The table tells how many limit orders identified high 
frequency traders post at i ticks away from the best prices. The data highlights the differences in the 
activity between stocks as the most traded stocks Nokia and Stora Enso have combined arrival rates 
of more than ten times those of Fortum, the least traded stock in the sample. Another important 
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finding is that most of the incoming orders arrive away from the best bid/ask price, a finding made 
also in previous literature (Cvitanic & Kirilenko, 2010, Potter & Bouchaud, 2002). 
 
Table 5:Limit order arrival rates for identified high frequency traders 
 
Graph 14 illustrates the shape of the distribution of limit order arrivals by plotting the arrival rates 
for high frequency traders relative to the total limit order arrivals for Ͳ ൒ ݅ < 10. The data reveals 
that the shape of the limit order arrival distribution is relatively harmonious for all stocks in the 
sample. Most of the limit orders from high frequency traders arrive at ݅ = 2 ticks away from the 
current best price. The share of incoming limit orders at the best available price is very low, just 
over 7 per cent on average. The distribution then rises steeply and peaks at 2 ticks away from the 
best price and then descends until between 3 and 5 ticks away from the best price before the so 
called tail begins. This suggests that majority of the high frequency trading order flow takes place 
away from the front of the order book but does not deviate far away from it. 
Limit order Fortum Nokia Sampo Stora UPM
0 0.971667 9.355741 1.227778 3.648148 1.162222
1 0.83963 25.23759 1.725556 14.2063 3.855185
2 3.51 59.18056 6.737407 38.7687 7.042037
3 1.431111 32.50333 4.574074 37.65056 3.943148
4 0.497593 3.166296 2.096296 19.87759 1.303889
5 0.217963 0.3 0.878519 6.855741 0.406111
6 0.033704 0.032407 0.325 1.083519 0.18963
7 0.007222 0.005556 0.149259 0.835185 0.162037
8 0.002222 0.002593 0.096481 0.189074 0.241667
9 0.001667 0.004444 0.016111 0.079815 0.222037
i
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Graph 14: Relative limit order arrivals for high frequency traders 
6.3.2. Cancellation arrival rates 
Because the cancellation rate is proportional to the amount of orders at a particular price level, the 
steady state of the order book, ܳ௜, must be calculated first. The steady state gives the average 
amount of orders at a distance (݅) from the best quote. The steady state is calculated as 
ܳ௜ = ଵெσ ௜ܵ௝ெ௝ୀଵ  for Ͳ ൑ ݅ < 10, 
where M is the number of quote rows and  ௜ܵ  is the amount of outstanding shares bid at a distance (݅) from the best quote for both buy and sell queues.  
The cancellation rate is then calculated as 
ߠෘ(݅) = ே೎ሺ೔)ௌ೎ሺ೔)
்ொ೔
 for Ͳ ൑ ݅ < 10, 
where ௖ܰሺ௜) is the number of cancellations at a distance (݅)  from the best quote, ܵ ௖ሺ௜) is the average 
size of the cancellation at a distance (݅)  from the best quote, ܶ is total trading time in minutes and 
ܳ௜ is the average queue size at a distance (݅)  from the best quote. 
Table 6 lists the cancellation arrival rates for identified high frequency traders in each stock. The 
numbers give the relation of average quantity cancelled at given distance (݅) from the best quote in 
a minute and the average queue size at distance (݅) from the best quote. In other words, a unit value 
would indicate a 100 per cent cancellation turnaround per minute.  
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Table 6: Cancellation arrival rates for high frequency traders 
Graph 15 plots the cancellation arrival rates as relative values of the sum of the arrival rates for 
Ͳ ൑ ݅ < 10. The data suggests that in relation to the steady state of the order book, most 
cancellation occurs away from the front of the order book but relatively close to it. In other words, 
the average cancellation turnaround increases as we move away from the front of the order book but 
decreases after 3 ticks. 
 
Graph 15: Relative distribution of cancellation arrival rates 
  
Cancellation arrival Fortum Nokia Sampo Stora UPM
0 0.13 0.61 0.20 0.28 0.28
1 0.30 1.70 0.48 0.43 0.43
2 0.32 2.67 0.53 0.49 0.49
3 0.33 2.85 0.82 0.41 0.41
4 0.19 0.44 0.56 0.20 0.20
5 0.09 0.04 0.25 0.07 0.07
6 0.04 0.01 0.10 0.04 0.04
7 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.03
8 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.05
9 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.05
i
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6.4. Arrival rate dynamics 
This section investigates the dynamics of limit order and cancellation arrival rates of the identified 
high frequency trading accounts. By looking at these dynamics, it is possible to see if some events 
have a tendency to lead to other events and if there are tendencies for contemporaneous movements 
in the arrival rate time series.   
For each stock and trading day, limit order and cancellation arrival rates with Ͳ ൑ ݅ < 4 ticks away 
from the current best prices are recorded for each 100 millisecond time interval ݐ. Then the 
dynamics of the arrival rates and the best bid and ask prices for each period are studied by the 
following VAR-model: 
REGRESSION (II) 
Let ঀ௧ = (yଵ௧ , yଶ௧ , … , yଶଶ௧) denote an (22ݔ1) vector of the time series variables: 
x yଵ௧=arrival_Bi_0 (Total quantity of buy orders at best bid price during period t) 
x yଶ௧=arrival_Bi_1(Total quantity of buy orders at best bid price +1 tick during period t) 
x yଷ௧=arrival_Bi_2 
x yସ௧=arrival_Bi_3 
x yହ௧=arrival_Bi_4 
x y଺௧=arrival_Si_0 (Total quantity of sell orders at best ask price during period t) 
x y଻௧=arrival_Si_1 
x y଼௧=arrival_Si_2 
x yଽ௧=arrival_Si_3 
x yଵ଴௧=arrival_Si_4 
x yଵଵ௧=arrival_CBi_0 (Total quantity of cancelled buy orders at best bid price during 
period t) 
x yଵଶ௧=arrival_CBi_1 
x yଵଷ௧=arrival_CBi_2 
x yଵସ௧=arrival_CBi_3 
x yଵହ௧=arrival_CBi_4 
x yଵ଺௧=arrival_CSi_0 (Total quantity of cancelled sell orders at best ask price during period 
t) 
x yଵ଻௧=arrival_CSi_1 
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x yଵ଼௧=arrival_CSi_2 
x yଵଽ௧=arrival_CSi_3 
x yଶ଴௧=arrival_CSi_4 
x yଶଵ௧=bid_C (change in the best bid price during period t) 
x yଶଶ௧=ask_C (change in the best ask price during period t) 
 
Then the VAR model can be expressed as 
ঀ௧ = ܿ ൅ ȫ ௧ܻିଵ+ߝ௧  
where ܿ is the constant term and ȫ is a (22ݔ22) matrix including all the coefficients. In other terms 
each endogenous variable is estimated by its own lagged values and lagged values of all the other 
variables. 
The results of Regression (II) are provided in Appendix B. Because of space limitations, the results 
are provided for one stock only, but identical results are found for the whole sample. An example of 
the results is provided here. Graph 16 gives the example VAR regression estimates for Regression 
(II). The left hand side variable is the quantity of incoming sell orders at two ticks away from the 
best ask price. The results show for example, that an increase in the best ask price at period ݐ െ 1 
reduces the amount of incoming sell orders with two ticks away from the best ask price. It is worth 
noting that cancellations are reported as negative numbers in the data, so that a negative coefficient 
for a cancellation measure indicates increased cancellation quantity.  
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Graph 16: Example of results of Regression (II) 
Perhaps the most interesting dynamic is found between the arrival rates of limit orders and 
cancellations with same distance from the best bid/ask price. The complete regression results show 
that an increase in the arrival rate of buy limit orders at distance ݆from the best bid price at period 
ݐ െ 1 increases the arrival rate of buy order cancellations at distance ݆from the best bid at period ݐ. 
The same is true for sell limit orders, where past limit order flow increases the cancellation rate with 
                                                                              
                    Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                              
       _cons     398.5928   91.68608     4.35   0.000     218.8913    578.2942
              
         L1.    -.0953404   .0357644    -2.67   0.008    -.1654373   -.0252434
arrival_CS~4  
              
         L1.    -.1541723   .0281036    -5.49   0.000    -.2092544   -.0990902
arrival_CS~3  
              
         L1.    -.3122865   .0346157    -9.02   0.000     -.380132    -.244441
arrival_CS~2  
              
         L1.     .0000424   .1035048     0.00   1.000    -.2028234    .2029081
arrival_CS~1  
              
         L1.      .383858   .1958276     1.96   0.050      .000043     .767673
arrival_CS~0  
              
         L1.    -.0432464   .0464748    -0.93   0.352    -.1343353    .0478426
arrival_CB~4  
              
         L1.      .000512   .0317367     0.02   0.987    -.0616907    .0627147
arrival_CB~3  
              
         L1.    -.0396756   .0373544    -1.06   0.288     -.112889    .0335377
arrival_CB~2  
              
         L1.    -.1641631   .0862134    -1.90   0.057    -.3331383    .0048122
arrival_CB~1  
              
         L1.    -.0886029   .2035308    -0.44   0.663     -.487516    .3103101
arrival_CB~0  
              
         L1.    -.1465527   .0383314    -3.82   0.000    -.2216809   -.0714245
arrival_Si_4  
              
         L1.    -.0457946   .0230217    -1.99   0.047    -.0909163   -.0006728
arrival_Si_3  
              
         L1.     .0829792   .0297596     2.79   0.005     .0246515    .1413069
arrival_Si_2  
              
         L1.     .1601682   .1269044     1.26   0.207    -.0885599    .4088963
arrival_Si_1  
              
         L1.     -.151531   .2556724    -0.59   0.553    -.6526398    .3495777
arrival_Si_0  
              
         L1.    -.0001281   .0429394    -0.00   0.998    -.0842879    .0840316
arrival_Bi_4  
              
         L1.      .047776   .0280491     1.70   0.089    -.0071992    .1027512
arrival_Bi_3  
              
         L1.     .0520987   .0353671     1.47   0.141    -.0172196    .1214169
arrival_Bi_2  
              
         L1.     -.436053   .1102793    -3.95   0.000    -.6521965   -.2199096
arrival_Bi_1  
              
         L1.     .1629438   .1815734     0.90   0.370    -.1929336    .5188212
arrival_Bi_0  
              
         L1.    -23.02376   6.781262    -3.40   0.001    -36.31479   -9.732736
       ask_c  
              
         L1.    -7.885113   6.081601    -1.30   0.195    -19.80483    4.034606
       bid_c  
arrival_Si_2  
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the same distance the following period. Given that the time period used is 100ms, this implies that 
the identified high frequency trading accounts often cancel their limit orders within a timespan of 
200ms.  
Interestingly, a similar feedback is found to exist in the opposing direction. The results suggest that 
an increase in the buy (sell) cancellation arrival rate at distance  ݆ from the best price leads to an 
increase in the buy (sell) limit order arrival rate with the same distance during the next period. 
These results suggest two discernible behavioral patterns in the order flow of the identified high 
frequency traders. On one hand they react to limit order book events such as an increase in the bid 
or ask price by cancelling their existing orders, which is followed by increased arrival rates of new 
limit orders in the period following the cancellation. On the other hand they often cancel their limit 
orders rapidly, within a timespan of 200ms, a practice known as “pinging”. These rapid messages to 
the system can be used for tracking hidden liquidity, for “sniping” other orders, or to distort other 
limit order signals.  
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6.5. Arrival rates and stock price behavior 
This section investigates the short-term effects of high frequency trading order flow on stock price. 
Order flow is measured by arrival rates of limit orders with  Ͳ ൑ ݅ < 5 ticks away from the current 
best prices, and only limit orders coming from the identified high frequency traders are counted. 
Each stock is studied individually, and each trading day is divided into  ݐ time intervals.  
 For each time interval ݐ, the following variables are calculated: 
x Limit buy order arrival rates with  Ͳ ൑ ݅ < 5 ticks away from the best price 
x Limit sell order arrival rates with  Ͳ ൑ ݅ < 5 ticks away from the best price 
x Percentage increase in midprice during interval ݐ 
Then, the following OLS regression is estimated for each stock and each trading day. The results of 
the regressions are reported in Appendix B. 
REGRESSION (III) 
ܯܫܦܴܲܫܥܧ_ܥܪܣܰܩܧ௧= ߚଵ + ߚଶ௜ܮܫܯܫܶ_ܤܷܻ_ܱܴܦܧܴ_ܣܴܴ_ܴܣܶܧ௜,௧ିଵ+ ߚଷ௜ܮܫܯܫܶ_ܵܧܮܮ_ܱܴܦܧܴ_ܣܴܴ_ܴܣܶܧ௜,௧ିଵ + ߝ௧  
     
The regression specification uses lagged variables for order arrival rates and checks if the order 
flow behavior of the identified high frequency trading accounts influences stock price in the short 
term. After extensive studies with different time period lengths, it seems that for the less traded 
stocks Sampo, Fortum, and UPM, past order flow predicts future stock price change with time 
period ݐ set around 100-150ms. For Stora Enso, past order flow seems to predict future stock price 
change with ݐ set around 60-80ms, and for Nokia no statistically significant relationship is found 
with any time period ݐ value.  
The results indicate that increased arrival rates in the front of the order book on buy side predict 
higher stock price in the following period, while increased arrival rates in the front of the order 
book on sell side predict lower stock price in the following period. The front of the order book 
refers here to limit orders arriving at the best current bid/ask price or at most one tick away from it. 
The effect is opposite for the back of the order book, which in this context refers to limit orders 
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arriving at 4 or 5 ticks away from the best price. For these arrival rates, an increased rate on buy 
side often leads to lower stock price in the following period, while an increased rate on sell side 
leads to higher stock price. These effects, however, were not statistically significant across the 
whole sample but showed significant variation in results. 
The three less traded stocks Sampo, Fortum, and UPM also exhibit smaller degrees of HFT activity, 
as was shown in Chapter 6.1. This leads to an interesting question of whether these three stocks 
show a relationship between high frequency trading order flow and stock price change with higher ݐ 
values because of smaller degree of high frequency trading activity. It is logical to assume that more 
traded stocks with better market quality, such as Stora Enso and Nokia, would show no relationship 
of this kind, or at least weaker relationship. A relationship with smaller time period length can be 
regarded as weaker because it implies that the relationship only holds for a short period of time.    
The results of regression (II) show that there exists a short-term relationship between high 
frequency trading order flow and stock price, but the results are not uniform within stocks in the 
sample. For some stocks the high frequency trading order flow around the best bid/ask prices is a 
significant predictor of future stock price. Further studies should investigate this relationship more 
carefully in order to better understand the effects of high frequency trading on market quality. 
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7 Conclusion 
This study investigates the degree of high frequency trading in Helsinki Stock Exchange by 
identifying high frequency trading accounts from order level data. The findings of this study 
indicate that a handful of high frequency traders using sophisticated algorithms and accessing the 
marketplace with very low latencies dominate the limit order book. Together, the trading accounts 
identified as high frequency traders capture a majority of order flow in Helsinki Stock Exchange, up 
to 82 per cent of all orders, depending on the stock in question. 
The high frequency traders’ order generation is highly periodic, as measured with message runs. 
The high periodicity indicates that the high frequency traders react to changes in the order book by 
simultaneously updating a vast amount of their existing orders. Further, this study finds two 
discernible dynamics in the high frequency traders’ order flow behavior. On one hand their limit 
order cancellations are followed by new limit order messages within time period of 200ms. On the 
other hand they often cancel their limit orders rapidly after placing a limit order in the system, 
which suggests a process of constant offering renewal. 
The results of this study also indicate that there exists a weak short-term relationship between high 
frequency trading order flow and stock price change. The results suggests that increased limit order 
arrival rates for buy orders tend to increase the stock price, and increased limit order arrival rates for 
sell order to decrease the stock price. The duration of this relationship varies from 150ms to 60ms, 
depending on the security, and is non-existent for the most liquid share in the sample. 
Possible limitations to this study may arise from two sources. On one hand, the identification 
process of the high frequency trading accounts relies on arbitrarily chosen levels with respect to 
order flow shares, cancellation rates and hazard rates. While these levels were deliberately chosen 
conservatively so as not to overestimate the degree of high frequency trading, the arbitrary levels 
may expose the findings of this study to considerable measurement error. Future studies about the 
topic should address these issues by using richer data that allows for calculating more precise 
measures for identification. 
On the other hand, estimating the degree of high frequency trading in Helsinki Stock Exchange by 
looking only at the order flow data imposes limitations to this study as order flow measures may 
significantly overestimate the degree of high frequency trading in terms of traded shares. 
 
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APPENDIX A: Results for regression (II) 
Because of space limitations, results are showed for one stock and trading day: Nokia 26th 
November. Results are similar for other stocks and trading days as well. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                
arrival_CSi_4        23     917.515   0.2837   746.0492   0.0000
arrival_CSi_3        23     3076.98   0.0719   145.9959   0.0000
arrival_CSi_2        23     3611.14   0.0588   117.7804   0.0000
arrival_CSi_1        23     1632.34   0.2244    545.149   0.0000
arrival_CSi_0        23     476.352   0.1853   428.6261   0.0000
arrival_CBi_4        23     526.067   0.3920   1214.626   0.0000
arrival_CBi_3        23      2246.2   0.1164   248.1844   0.0000
arrival_CBi_2        23     2995.83   0.1180   252.0088   0.0000
arrival_CBi_1        23     1264.56   0.2748   713.8995   0.0000
arrival_CBi_0        23      545.29   0.1754   400.7318   0.0000
arrival_Si_4         23      650.63   0.0240   46.25012   0.0018
arrival_Si_3         23     3652.86   0.0517   102.7917   0.0000
arrival_Si_2         23     4065.78   0.1396   305.5563   0.0000
arrival_Si_1         23     1434.82   0.0634    127.608   0.0000
arrival_Si_0         23     573.635   0.0534   106.2632   0.0000
arrival_Bi_4         23     499.563   0.5248   2080.677   0.0000
arrival_Bi_3         23     2584.96   0.0715   145.1391   0.0000
arrival_Bi_2         23     3763.64   0.1238   266.2268   0.0000
arrival_Bi_1         23     1233.69   0.1460   322.0926   0.0000
arrival_Bi_0         23     521.174   0.0255   49.33676   0.0007
ask_c                23     4.14431   0.0162    30.9359   0.0974
bid_c                23     8.54064   0.1369   298.8084   0.0000
                                                                
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  1.0e+127                         SBIC            =  356.9072
FPE            =  1.7e+127                         HQIC            =  355.9671
Log likelihood = -334298.7                         AIC             =   355.419
Sample:  1222 - 269938, but with gaps              No. of obs      =      1884
Vector autoregression
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       _cons    -.3212594   .2278126    -1.41   0.158    -.7677638    .1252451
              
         L1.    -.0001366   .0002004    -0.68   0.496    -.0005293    .0002562
arrival_CS~4  
              
         L1.     .0000388   .0000691     0.56   0.574    -.0000966    .0001742
arrival_CS~3  
              
         L1.    -.0000416   .0000669    -0.62   0.534    -.0001728    .0000895
arrival_CS~2  
              
         L1.     .0000593   .0001471     0.40   0.687    -.0002289    .0003476
arrival_CS~1  
              
         L1.     .0001732   .0005492     0.32   0.752    -.0009032    .0012496
arrival_CS~0  
              
         L1.    -.0004294   .0003683    -1.17   0.244    -.0011512    .0002925
arrival_CB~4  
              
         L1.     .0000531   .0000816     0.65   0.515    -.0001068     .000213
arrival_CB~3  
              
         L1.    -.0000146   .0000723    -0.20   0.840    -.0001564    .0001272
arrival_CB~2  
              
         L1.     .0000496     .00012     0.41   0.679    -.0001855    .0002847
arrival_CB~1  
              
         L1.     .0011848   .0004447     2.66   0.008     .0003131    .0020564
arrival_CB~0  
              
         L1.     .0000913    .000165     0.55   0.580    -.0002321    .0004147
arrival_Si_4  
              
         L1.     .0000216    .000067     0.32   0.748    -.0001097    .0001529
arrival_Si_3  
              
         L1.    -6.20e-06   .0000562    -0.11   0.912    -.0001164     .000104
arrival_Si_2  
              
         L1.    -.0000441   .0001457    -0.30   0.762    -.0003298    .0002415
arrival_Si_1  
              
         L1.     .0001001   .0004625     0.22   0.829    -.0008064    .0010067
arrival_Si_0  
              
         L1.    -5.13e-06   .0003553    -0.01   0.988    -.0007015    .0006912
arrival_Bi_4  
              
         L1.     7.87e-06   .0000706     0.11   0.911    -.0001305    .0001463
arrival_Bi_3  
              
         L1.     .0000327   .0000622     0.53   0.599    -.0000892    .0001546
arrival_Bi_2  
              
         L1.    -.0000897   .0001551    -0.58   0.563    -.0003937    .0002143
arrival_Bi_1  
              
         L1.     .0008961   .0003738     2.40   0.017     .0001635    .0016288
arrival_Bi_0  
              
         L1.      .115661    .018819     6.15   0.000     .0787765    .1525456
       ask_c  
              
         L1.     -.245809    .014835   -16.57   0.000     -.274885   -.2167329
       bid_c  
bid_c         
                                                                              
                    Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
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       _cons     .0148449   .1105451     0.13   0.893    -.2018195    .2315092
              
         L1.     .0000549   .0000972     0.56   0.573    -.0001357    .0002454
arrival_CS~4  
              
         L1.    -.0000306   .0000335    -0.91   0.361    -.0000963    .0000351
arrival_CS~3  
              
         L1.    -.0000155   .0000325    -0.48   0.634    -.0000791    .0000482
arrival_CS~2  
              
         L1.    -.0000557   .0000714    -0.78   0.435    -.0001956    .0000841
arrival_CS~1  
              
         L1.     .0001095   .0002665     0.41   0.681    -.0004128    .0006318
arrival_CS~0  
              
         L1.    -.0000293   .0001787    -0.16   0.870    -.0003796    .0003209
arrival_CB~4  
              
         L1.     3.87e-06   .0000396     0.10   0.922    -.0000737    .0000815
arrival_CB~3  
              
         L1.    -.0000356   .0000351    -1.02   0.310    -.0001044    .0000332
arrival_CB~2  
              
         L1.     .0000551   .0000582     0.95   0.344     -.000059    .0001692
arrival_CB~1  
              
         L1.     .0002763   .0002158     1.28   0.200    -.0001466    .0006993
arrival_CB~0  
              
         L1.      .000053   .0000801     0.66   0.508    -.0001039      .00021
arrival_Si_4  
              
         L1.    -5.68e-06   .0000325    -0.17   0.861    -.0000694     .000058
arrival_Si_3  
              
         L1.     1.17e-07   .0000273     0.00   0.997    -.0000534    .0000536
arrival_Si_2  
              
         L1.    -.0000234   .0000707    -0.33   0.741     -.000162    .0001153
arrival_Si_1  
              
         L1.    -.0002588   .0002244    -1.15   0.249    -.0006986    .0001811
arrival_Si_0  
              
         L1.    -.0000182   .0001724    -0.11   0.916    -.0003561    .0003197
arrival_Bi_4  
              
         L1.    -4.96e-07   .0000343    -0.01   0.988    -.0000677    .0000667
arrival_Bi_3  
              
         L1.    -.0000593   .0000302    -1.96   0.050    -.0001184   -1.06e-07
arrival_Bi_2  
              
         L1.    -.0001339   .0000753    -1.78   0.075    -.0002814    .0000137
arrival_Bi_1  
              
         L1.    -.0000388   .0001814    -0.21   0.831    -.0003943    .0003167
arrival_Bi_0  
              
         L1.    -.0188153   .0091318    -2.06   0.039    -.0367134   -.0009173
       ask_c  
              
         L1.    -.0007201   .0071986    -0.10   0.920    -.0148291    .0133889
       bid_c  
ask_c         
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       _cons     42.26456   13.90177     3.04   0.002     15.01759    69.51154
              
         L1.    -.0030413   .0122283    -0.25   0.804    -.0270083    .0209257
arrival_CS~4  
              
         L1.    -.0079285   .0042142    -1.88   0.060    -.0161882    .0003312
arrival_CS~3  
              
         L1.     .0010355   .0040833     0.25   0.800    -.0069676    .0090385
arrival_CS~2  
              
         L1.     .0055392   .0089738     0.62   0.537    -.0120491    .0231274
arrival_CS~1  
              
         L1.     .0193634    .033514     0.58   0.563    -.0463229    .0850496
arrival_CS~0  
              
         L1.     .0002137   .0224747     0.01   0.992    -.0438358    .0442633
arrival_CB~4  
              
         L1.     .0023247    .004978     0.47   0.641    -.0074321    .0120814
arrival_CB~3  
              
         L1.     .0061794   .0044137     1.40   0.161    -.0024713    .0148301
arrival_CB~2  
              
         L1.       .00249   .0073198     0.34   0.734    -.0118565    .0168364
arrival_CB~1  
              
         L1.    -.1116017    .027138    -4.11   0.000    -.1647913   -.0584121
arrival_CB~0  
              
         L1.    -.0010914   .0100692    -0.11   0.914    -.0208266    .0186437
arrival_Si_4  
              
         L1.    -.0040125   .0040882    -0.98   0.326    -.0120252    .0040002
arrival_Si_3  
              
         L1.     .0032721   .0034322     0.95   0.340    -.0034549    .0099991
arrival_Si_2  
              
         L1.     .0026611   .0088938     0.30   0.765    -.0147704    .0200926
arrival_Si_1  
              
         L1.     .0428001   .0282248     1.52   0.129    -.0125196    .0981198
arrival_Si_0  
              
         L1.    -.0002791   .0216807    -0.01   0.990    -.0427726    .0422143
arrival_Bi_4  
              
         L1.     .0013373   .0043089     0.31   0.756    -.0071081    .0097826
arrival_Bi_3  
              
         L1.      .001897   .0037953     0.50   0.617    -.0055417    .0093356
arrival_Bi_2  
              
         L1.     .0113094   .0094652     1.19   0.232    -.0072421    .0298609
arrival_Bi_1  
              
         L1.     .0026218   .0228112     0.11   0.908    -.0420873    .0473309
arrival_Bi_0  
              
         L1.     1.243319   1.148388     1.08   0.279     -1.00748    3.494118
       ask_c  
              
         L1.    -1.281447   .9052736    -1.42   0.157    -3.055751    .4928562
       bid_c  
arrival_Bi_0  
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       _cons     141.8036   32.90749     4.31   0.000     77.30613    206.3011
              
         L1.     .0065094   .0289461     0.22   0.822    -.0502239    .0632427
arrival_CS~4  
              
         L1.    -.0045178   .0099756    -0.45   0.651    -.0240697     .015034
arrival_CS~3  
              
         L1.    -.0111895   .0096656    -1.16   0.247    -.0301338    .0077548
arrival_CS~2  
              
         L1.     .0085998   .0212422     0.40   0.686    -.0330341    .0502338
arrival_CS~1  
              
         L1.    -.0123364   .0793324    -0.16   0.876    -.1678252    .1431523
arrival_CS~0  
              
         L1.     .0374903   .0532007     0.70   0.481    -.0667812    .1417619
arrival_CB~4  
              
         L1.     .0243766   .0117837     2.07   0.039      .001281    .0474723
arrival_CB~3  
              
         L1.     .0082924   .0104479     0.79   0.427    -.0121851    .0287698
arrival_CB~2  
              
         L1.    -.1465094   .0173269    -8.46   0.000    -.1804695   -.1125493
arrival_CB~1  
              
         L1.     .0005304   .0642396     0.01   0.993    -.1253769    .1264378
arrival_CB~0  
              
         L1.    -.0310718   .0238351    -1.30   0.192    -.0777878    .0156442
arrival_Si_4  
              
         L1.    -.0066822   .0096773    -0.69   0.490    -.0256495     .012285
arrival_Si_3  
              
         L1.    -.0024255   .0081245    -0.30   0.765    -.0183493    .0134983
arrival_Si_2  
              
         L1.    -.0372012   .0210528    -1.77   0.077     -.078464    .0040616
arrival_Si_1  
              
         L1.    -.0605009   .0668123    -0.91   0.365    -.1914505    .0704488
arrival_Si_0  
              
         L1.     .0031893   .0513214     0.06   0.950    -.0973988    .1037774
arrival_Bi_4  
              
         L1.     .0283877   .0101998     2.78   0.005     .0083964     .048379
arrival_Bi_3  
              
         L1.     .0357307    .008984     3.98   0.000     .0181223    .0533391
arrival_Bi_2  
              
         L1.     .1442669   .0224056     6.44   0.000     .1003529     .188181
arrival_Bi_1  
              
         L1.     .0438405   .0539973     0.81   0.417    -.0619923    .1496733
arrival_Bi_0  
              
         L1.     2.649994   2.718399     0.97   0.330     -2.67797    7.977958
       ask_c  
              
         L1.    -.7172943   2.142913    -0.33   0.738    -4.917326    3.482737
       bid_c  
arrival_Bi_1  
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       _cons     710.6688   100.3911     7.08   0.000     513.9059    907.4317
              
         L1.     .0299332    .088306     0.34   0.735    -.1431435    .2030098
arrival_CS~4  
              
         L1.     .0124106   .0304326     0.41   0.683    -.0472362    .0720574
arrival_CS~3  
              
         L1.     .0300815    .029487     1.02   0.308     -.027712     .087875
arrival_CS~2  
              
         L1.    -.0439111   .0648037    -0.68   0.498     -.170924    .0831019
arrival_CS~1  
              
         L1.     .0507794   .2420199     0.21   0.834    -.4235709    .5251297
arrival_CS~0  
              
         L1.    -.1208991   .1622998    -0.74   0.456    -.4390008    .1972026
arrival_CB~4  
              
         L1.    -.0112049   .0359486    -0.31   0.755    -.0816628    .0592531
arrival_CB~3  
              
         L1.    -.2895938   .0318734    -9.09   0.000    -.3520644   -.2271231
arrival_CB~2  
              
         L1.    -.3227343   .0528593    -6.11   0.000    -.4263366    -.219132
arrival_CB~1  
              
         L1.    -.2900626   .1959761    -1.48   0.139    -.6741688    .0940436
arrival_CB~0  
              
         L1.     .0217589    .072714     0.30   0.765    -.1207579    .1642756
arrival_Si_4  
              
         L1.    -.0327159   .0295227    -1.11   0.268    -.0905794    .0251476
arrival_Si_3  
              
         L1.     .0360822   .0247856     1.46   0.145    -.0124966     .084661
arrival_Si_2  
              
         L1.     .0913788    .064226     1.42   0.155    -.0345018    .2172594
arrival_Si_1  
              
         L1.    -.0912335   .2038245    -0.45   0.654    -.4907221    .3082552
arrival_Si_0  
              
         L1.     .0310114   .1565665     0.20   0.843    -.2758533    .3378761
arrival_Bi_4  
              
         L1.    -.0682767   .0311167    -2.19   0.028    -.1292644   -.0072891
arrival_Bi_3  
              
         L1.     .0686636   .0274077     2.51   0.012     .0149455    .1223816
arrival_Bi_2  
              
         L1.    -.0185313   .0683527    -0.27   0.786    -.1525002    .1154376
arrival_Bi_1  
              
         L1.     -.356261   .1647299    -2.16   0.031    -.6791258   -.0333963
arrival_Bi_0  
              
         L1.     7.455813   8.293034     0.90   0.369    -8.798235    23.70986
       ask_c  
              
         L1.     16.70032   6.537394     2.55   0.011     3.887262    29.51338
       bid_c  
arrival_Bi_2  
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       _cons     345.3134   68.95118     5.01   0.000     210.1715    480.4552
              
         L1.     .0496357   .0606509     0.82   0.413    -.0692378    .1685092
arrival_CS~4  
              
         L1.    -.0201052   .0209019    -0.96   0.336    -.0610722    .0208618
arrival_CS~3  
              
         L1.    -.0127975   .0202525    -0.63   0.527    -.0524916    .0268966
arrival_CS~2  
              
         L1.     .0372628   .0445089     0.84   0.402     -.049973    .1244986
arrival_CS~1  
              
         L1.     .2141301   .1662255     1.29   0.198     -.111666    .5399261
arrival_CS~0  
              
         L1.    -.0988995   .1114717    -0.89   0.375      -.31738     .119581
arrival_CB~4  
              
         L1.    -.1758753   .0246904    -7.12   0.000    -.2242677    -.127483
arrival_CB~3  
              
         L1.    -.1002656   .0218915    -4.58   0.000    -.1431721   -.0573592
arrival_CB~2  
              
         L1.    -.0225841   .0363051    -0.62   0.534    -.0937409    .0485726
arrival_CB~1  
              
         L1.    -.2863561   .1346015    -2.13   0.033    -.5501702   -.0225421
arrival_CB~0  
              
         L1.    -.0198953   .0499418    -0.40   0.690    -.1177795    .0779889
arrival_Si_4  
              
         L1.     .0099342    .020277     0.49   0.624     -.029808    .0496763
arrival_Si_3  
              
         L1.     .0073241   .0170234     0.43   0.667    -.0260411    .0406893
arrival_Si_2  
              
         L1.    -.0592845   .0441121    -1.34   0.179    -.1457426    .0271735
arrival_Si_1  
              
         L1.      .061668   .1399919     0.44   0.660    -.2127111    .3360471
arrival_Si_0  
              
         L1.     .1549389   .1075339     1.44   0.150    -.0558237    .3657015
arrival_Bi_4  
              
         L1.    -.0095979   .0213718    -0.45   0.653    -.0514858      .03229
arrival_Bi_3  
              
         L1.    -.0435312   .0188243    -2.31   0.021    -.0804262   -.0066363
arrival_Bi_2  
              
         L1.    -.0700998   .0469464    -1.49   0.135    -.1621131    .0219135
arrival_Bi_1  
              
         L1.    -.2184972   .1131408    -1.93   0.053    -.4402491    .0032546
arrival_Bi_0  
              
         L1.     13.30098    5.69587     2.34   0.020     2.137282    24.46468
       ask_c  
              
         L1.    -6.197138   4.490052    -1.38   0.168    -14.99748    2.603201
       bid_c  
arrival_Bi_3  
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       _cons     18.41058   13.32531     1.38   0.167    -7.706541    44.52771
              
         L1.     -.002196   .0117212    -0.19   0.851    -.0251692    .0207772
arrival_CS~4  
              
         L1.     .0015453   .0040394     0.38   0.702    -.0063718    .0094625
arrival_CS~3  
              
         L1.     .0007351   .0039139     0.19   0.851    -.0069361    .0084062
arrival_CS~2  
              
         L1.    -.0081383   .0086017    -0.95   0.344    -.0249973    .0087206
arrival_CS~1  
              
         L1.    -.0639103   .0321243    -1.99   0.047    -.1268727   -.0009479
arrival_CS~0  
              
         L1.    -.4567738   .0215427   -21.20   0.000    -.4989967   -.4145509
arrival_CB~4  
              
         L1.     .0073528   .0047716     1.54   0.123    -.0019994    .0167049
arrival_CB~3  
              
         L1.    -.0049016   .0042307    -1.16   0.247    -.0131935    .0033904
arrival_CB~2  
              
         L1.     .0015683   .0070162     0.22   0.823    -.0121832    .0153199
arrival_CB~1  
              
         L1.    -.0076265   .0260127    -0.29   0.769    -.0586104    .0433575
arrival_CB~0  
              
         L1.    -.0014732   .0096516    -0.15   0.879      -.02039    .0174436
arrival_Si_4  
              
         L1.    -.0021357   .0039187    -0.55   0.586    -.0098162    .0055447
arrival_Si_3  
              
         L1.    -.0011259   .0032899    -0.34   0.732    -.0075739    .0053222
arrival_Si_2  
              
         L1.      .001627    .008525     0.19   0.849    -.0150816    .0183357
arrival_Si_1  
              
         L1.      .040103   .0270544     1.48   0.138    -.0129228    .0931287
arrival_Si_0  
              
         L1.     .2190911   .0207817    10.54   0.000     .1783597    .2598225
arrival_Bi_4  
              
         L1.    -.0120077   .0041302    -2.91   0.004    -.0201028   -.0039125
arrival_Bi_3  
              
         L1.     .0028626   .0036379     0.79   0.431    -.0042677    .0099928
arrival_Bi_2  
              
         L1.    -.0068993   .0090727    -0.76   0.447    -.0246816    .0108829
arrival_Bi_1  
              
         L1.    -.0025753   .0218653    -0.12   0.906    -.0454304    .0402798
arrival_Bi_0  
              
         L1.    -.1023054   1.100768    -0.09   0.926     -2.25977     2.05516
       ask_c  
              
         L1.    -1.860627   .8677346    -2.14   0.032    -3.561356   -.1598983
       bid_c  
arrival_Bi_4  
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       _cons     15.03927   15.30111     0.98   0.326    -14.95035     45.0289
              
         L1.    -.0121132   .0134592    -0.90   0.368    -.0384927    .0142663
arrival_CS~4  
              
         L1.    -.0107597   .0046384    -2.32   0.020    -.0198507   -.0016686
arrival_CS~3  
              
         L1.    -.0325974   .0044943    -7.25   0.000     -.041406   -.0237888
arrival_CS~2  
              
         L1.    -.0168499   .0098771    -1.71   0.088    -.0362086    .0025088
arrival_CS~1  
              
         L1.     .0052782   .0368875     0.14   0.886    -.0670199    .0775764
arrival_CS~0  
              
         L1.    -.0217343   .0247369    -0.88   0.380    -.0702178    .0267492
arrival_CB~4  
              
         L1.     .0176336   .0054791     3.22   0.001     .0068947    .0283724
arrival_CB~3  
              
         L1.     .0147719    .004858     3.04   0.002     .0052504    .0242934
arrival_CB~2  
              
         L1.     .0120706   .0080566     1.50   0.134      -.00372    .0278611
arrival_CB~1  
              
         L1.    -.0131911   .0298697    -0.44   0.659    -.0717347    .0453525
arrival_CB~0  
              
         L1.    -.0200223   .0110827    -1.81   0.071     -.041744    .0016994
arrival_Si_4  
              
         L1.    -.0150418   .0044997    -3.34   0.001     -.023861   -.0062225
arrival_Si_3  
              
         L1.    -.0144683   .0037777    -3.83   0.000    -.0218724   -.0070642
arrival_Si_2  
              
         L1.    -.0304089    .009789    -3.11   0.002     -.049595   -.0112228
arrival_Si_1  
              
         L1.    -.0395359   .0310659    -1.27   0.203     -.100424    .0213522
arrival_Si_0  
              
         L1.    -.0120454   .0238631    -0.50   0.614    -.0588162    .0347254
arrival_Bi_4  
              
         L1.      .011566   .0047427     2.44   0.015     .0022705    .0208614
arrival_Bi_3  
              
         L1.     .0260305   .0041773     6.23   0.000      .017843    .0342179
arrival_Bi_2  
              
         L1.     .0079575    .010418     0.76   0.445    -.0124613    .0283764
arrival_Bi_1  
              
         L1.    -.0023269   .0251073    -0.09   0.926    -.0515364    .0468825
arrival_Bi_0  
              
         L1.     -.456336   1.263983    -0.36   0.718    -2.933698    2.021026
       ask_c  
              
         L1.    -.5268404   .9963975    -0.53   0.597    -2.479744    1.426063
       bid_c  
arrival_Si_0  
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       _cons      153.382   38.27225     4.01   0.000     78.36977    228.3942
              
         L1.    -.0490752   .0336651    -1.46   0.145    -.1150574    .0169071
arrival_CS~4  
              
         L1.    -.0323607   .0116019    -2.79   0.005       -.0551   -.0096215
arrival_CS~3  
              
         L1.    -.0299672   .0112414    -2.67   0.008        -.052   -.0079345
arrival_CS~2  
              
         L1.    -.1266182   .0247052    -5.13   0.000    -.1750395   -.0781968
arrival_CS~1  
              
         L1.     .0309953   .0922656     0.34   0.737     -.149842    .2118326
arrival_CS~0  
              
         L1.     .2014889   .0618738     3.26   0.001     .0802185    .3227593
arrival_CB~4  
              
         L1.     .0216931   .0137047     1.58   0.113    -.0051677    .0485539
arrival_CB~3  
              
         L1.     .0273245   .0121511     2.25   0.025     .0035087    .0511403
arrival_CB~2  
              
         L1.     .0574206   .0201516     2.85   0.004     .0179241     .096917
arrival_CB~1  
              
         L1.    -.2482027   .0747123    -3.32   0.001    -.3946362   -.1017693
arrival_CB~0  
              
         L1.    -.0181241   .0277209    -0.65   0.513     -.072456    .0362077
arrival_Si_4  
              
         L1.    -.0156707    .011255    -1.39   0.164    -.0377301    .0063886
arrival_Si_3  
              
         L1.    -.0062001    .009449    -0.66   0.512    -.0247199    .0123197
arrival_Si_2  
              
         L1.     .0764026    .024485     3.12   0.002      .028413    .1243923
arrival_Si_1  
              
         L1.    -.1764336   .0777043    -2.27   0.023    -.3287313   -.0241359
arrival_Si_0  
              
         L1.     .2362733   .0596881     3.96   0.000     .1192868    .3532598
arrival_Bi_4  
              
         L1.     .0157951   .0118627     1.33   0.183    -.0074553    .0390455
arrival_Bi_3  
              
         L1.     .0401112   .0104487     3.84   0.000     .0196322    .0605902
arrival_Bi_2  
              
         L1.     .0499257   .0260582     1.92   0.055    -.0011475    .1009989
arrival_Bi_1  
              
         L1.    -.1358261   .0628003    -2.16   0.031    -.2589124   -.0127399
arrival_Bi_0  
              
         L1.     .4166517   3.161567     0.13   0.895    -5.779905    6.613209
       ask_c  
              
         L1.    -1.682026   2.492261    -0.67   0.500    -6.566769    3.202716
       bid_c  
arrival_Si_1  
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       _cons     791.1348   108.4504     7.29   0.000     578.5759    1003.694
              
         L1.    -.0641632   .0953952    -0.67   0.501    -.2511344     .122808
arrival_CS~4  
              
         L1.    -.0994682   .0328757    -3.03   0.002    -.1639035    -.035033
arrival_CS~3  
              
         L1.    -.2064049   .0318543    -6.48   0.000    -.2688381   -.1439717
arrival_CS~2  
              
         L1.    -.2283553   .0700061    -3.26   0.001    -.3655648   -.0911458
arrival_CS~1  
              
         L1.     .3120265   .2614492     1.19   0.233    -.2004045    .8244575
arrival_CS~0  
              
         L1.     .0312397   .1753292     0.18   0.859    -.3123991    .3748786
arrival_CB~4  
              
         L1.     .1300831   .0388345     3.35   0.001     .0539688    .2061974
arrival_CB~3  
              
         L1.     .1264044   .0344322     3.67   0.000     .0589187    .1938902
arrival_CB~2  
              
         L1.     .3296735   .0571028     5.77   0.000      .217754    .4415929
arrival_CB~1  
              
         L1.    -.4461022   .2117091    -2.11   0.035    -.8610443     -.03116
arrival_CB~0  
              
         L1.    -.0319294   .0785514    -0.41   0.684    -.1858873    .1220286
arrival_Si_4  
              
         L1.    -.0487466   .0318928    -1.53   0.126    -.1112554    .0137621
arrival_Si_3  
              
         L1.    -.0392741   .0267753    -1.47   0.142    -.0917528    .0132046
arrival_Si_2  
              
         L1.     .3170979    .069382     4.57   0.000     .1811116    .4530842
arrival_Si_1  
              
         L1.     .7351668   .2201875     3.34   0.001     .3036073    1.166726
arrival_Si_0  
              
         L1.     .0600842   .1691356     0.36   0.722    -.2714156    .3915839
arrival_Bi_4  
              
         L1.      .068197   .0336148     2.03   0.042     .0023133    .1340807
arrival_Bi_3  
              
         L1.     .2049033    .029608     6.92   0.000     .1468727    .2629338
arrival_Bi_2  
              
         L1.     .3243963   .0738401     4.39   0.000     .1796724    .4691202
arrival_Bi_1  
              
         L1.    -.2748164   .1779544    -1.54   0.123    -.6236007    .0739679
arrival_Bi_0  
              
         L1.    -6.639691   8.958797    -0.74   0.459    -24.19861    10.91923
       ask_c  
              
         L1.      1.35472   7.062215     0.19   0.848    -12.48697    15.19641
       bid_c  
arrival_Si_2  
                                                                              
86 
 
 
  
       _cons     596.2459   97.43616     6.12   0.000     405.2745    787.2173
              
         L1.     -.145323   .0857068    -1.70   0.090    -.3133053    .0226593
arrival_CS~4  
              
         L1.    -.1302149   .0295369    -4.41   0.000     -.188106   -.0723237
arrival_CS~3  
              
         L1.    -.0668998   .0286191    -2.34   0.019    -.1229922   -.0108073
arrival_CS~2  
              
         L1.    -.2317382   .0628963    -3.68   0.000    -.3550127   -.1084638
arrival_CS~1  
              
         L1.     .3488563   .2348963     1.49   0.138     -.111532    .8092446
arrival_CS~0  
              
         L1.     .1360124   .1575227     0.86   0.388    -.1727264    .4447511
arrival_CB~4  
              
         L1.     .0166515   .0348905     0.48   0.633    -.0517326    .0850356
arrival_CB~3  
              
         L1.      .040101   .0309352     1.30   0.195    -.0205309    .1007329
arrival_CB~2  
              
         L1.     .1120483   .0513034     2.18   0.029     .0114954    .2126011
arrival_CB~1  
              
         L1.     .1065073   .1902078     0.56   0.576    -.2662932    .4793078
arrival_CB~0  
              
         L1.     .0087237   .0705737     0.12   0.902    -.1295983    .1470456
arrival_Si_4  
              
         L1.    -.0071596   .0286538    -0.25   0.803    -.0633199    .0490008
arrival_Si_3  
              
         L1.      -.00637    .024056    -0.26   0.791     -.053519     .040779
arrival_Si_2  
              
         L1.    -.0221057   .0623356    -0.35   0.723    -.1442812    .1000698
arrival_Si_1  
              
         L1.     .2000412   .1978251     1.01   0.312    -.1876889    .5877714
arrival_Si_0  
              
         L1.     .1519242   .1519581     1.00   0.317    -.1459083    .4497567
arrival_Bi_4  
              
         L1.     .0100227   .0302008     0.33   0.740    -.0491698    .0692153
arrival_Bi_3  
              
         L1.     .1197522    .026601     4.50   0.000     .0676152    .1718891
arrival_Bi_2  
              
         L1.     .0808847   .0663409     1.22   0.223     -.049141    .2109104
arrival_Bi_1  
              
         L1.     .1126138   .1598813     0.70   0.481    -.2007478    .4259754
arrival_Bi_0  
              
         L1.     .4060755   8.048938     0.05   0.960    -15.36955     16.1817
       ask_c  
              
         L1.    -.5983339   6.344974    -0.09   0.925    -13.03425    11.83759
       bid_c  
arrival_Si_3  
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       _cons     94.50658   17.35487     5.45   0.000     60.49167    128.5215
              
         L1.    -.0860091   .0152657    -5.63   0.000    -.1159293   -.0560889
arrival_CS~4  
              
         L1.     .0007843    .005261     0.15   0.881     -.009527    .0110956
arrival_CS~3  
              
         L1.     .0036031   .0050975     0.71   0.480    -.0063879     .013594
arrival_CS~2  
              
         L1.     .0060056   .0112028     0.54   0.592    -.0159514    .0279627
arrival_CS~1  
              
         L1.    -.0095668   .0418386    -0.23   0.819     -.091569    .0724353
arrival_CS~0  
              
         L1.     .0054623   .0280572     0.19   0.846    -.0495288    .0604534
arrival_CB~4  
              
         L1.     .0058012   .0062145     0.93   0.351     -.006379    .0179815
arrival_CB~3  
              
         L1.     .0095554     .00551     1.73   0.083    -.0012441    .0203548
arrival_CB~2  
              
         L1.     .0075974   .0091379     0.83   0.406    -.0103126    .0255074
arrival_CB~1  
              
         L1.     -.006406   .0338789    -0.19   0.850    -.0728074    .0599955
arrival_CB~0  
              
         L1.    -.0050173   .0125703    -0.40   0.690    -.0296546    .0196199
arrival_Si_4  
              
         L1.    -.0001729   .0051037    -0.03   0.973    -.0101759    .0098301
arrival_Si_3  
              
         L1.    -.0027278   .0042847    -0.64   0.524    -.0111258    .0056701
arrival_Si_2  
              
         L1.     .0029031   .0111029     0.26   0.794    -.0188582    .0246644
arrival_Si_1  
              
         L1.    -.0058069   .0352357    -0.16   0.869    -.0748676    .0632537
arrival_Si_0  
              
         L1.      -.00149   .0270661    -0.06   0.956    -.0545385    .0515585
arrival_Bi_4  
              
         L1.     .0031234   .0053792     0.58   0.561    -.0074197    .0136665
arrival_Bi_3  
              
         L1.     .0113379    .004738     2.39   0.017     .0020515    .0206243
arrival_Bi_2  
              
         L1.     .0051373   .0118163     0.43   0.664    -.0180223    .0282968
arrival_Bi_1  
              
         L1.    -.0078164   .0284773    -0.27   0.784    -.0636309    .0479981
arrival_Bi_0  
              
         L1.    -1.308574   1.433638    -0.91   0.361    -4.118454    1.501306
       ask_c  
              
         L1.     .1089536   1.130136     0.10   0.923    -2.106073     2.32398
       bid_c  
arrival_Si_4  
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       _cons    -15.66399   14.54504    -1.08   0.282    -44.17174    12.84376
              
         L1.    -.0100289   .0127941    -0.78   0.433    -.0351049    .0150471
arrival_CS~4  
              
         L1.    -.0097492   .0044092    -2.21   0.027    -.0183911   -.0011074
arrival_CS~3  
              
         L1.       .01076   .0042722     2.52   0.012     .0023866    .0191333
arrival_CS~2  
              
         L1.    -.0275181    .009389    -2.93   0.003    -.0459202    -.009116
arrival_CS~1  
              
         L1.    -.0805403   .0350648    -2.30   0.022    -.1492659   -.0118146
arrival_CS~0  
              
         L1.     .0217006   .0235146     0.92   0.356    -.0243872    .0677884
arrival_CB~4  
              
         L1.     .0077773   .0052084     1.49   0.135    -.0024309    .0179855
arrival_CB~3  
              
         L1.     .0037706   .0046179     0.82   0.414    -.0052804    .0128215
arrival_CB~2  
              
         L1.     .0884981   .0076585    11.56   0.000     .0734878    .1035084
arrival_CB~1  
              
         L1.     .1474698   .0283938     5.19   0.000     .0918191    .2031206
arrival_CB~0  
              
         L1.      .009688   .0105351     0.92   0.358    -.0109604    .0303364
arrival_Si_4  
              
         L1.    -.0017319   .0042774    -0.40   0.686    -.0101154    .0066516
arrival_Si_3  
              
         L1.    -.0102361    .003591    -2.85   0.004    -.0172744   -.0031978
arrival_Si_2  
              
         L1.    -.0348514   .0093053    -3.75   0.000    -.0530895   -.0166134
arrival_Si_1  
              
         L1.    -.0531083   .0295309    -1.80   0.072    -.1109878    .0047711
arrival_Si_0  
              
         L1.     .0093325    .022684     0.41   0.681    -.0351272    .0537922
arrival_Bi_4  
              
         L1.     .0103326   .0045083     2.29   0.022     .0014965    .0191687
arrival_Bi_3  
              
         L1.     .0115159   .0039709     2.90   0.004      .003733    .0192987
arrival_Bi_2  
              
         L1.     .0116265   .0099032     1.17   0.240    -.0077834    .0310365
arrival_Bi_1  
              
         L1.     .0347407   .0238667     1.46   0.145    -.0120372    .0815186
arrival_Bi_0  
              
         L1.     .3330083   1.201526     0.28   0.782     -2.02194    2.687957
       ask_c  
              
         L1.     2.818738   .9471627     2.98   0.003     .9623338    4.675143
       bid_c  
arrival_CB~0  
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       _cons    -119.4122   33.73084    -3.54   0.000    -185.5234   -53.30095
              
         L1.    -.0112037   .0296703    -0.38   0.706    -.0693565    .0469491
arrival_CS~4  
              
         L1.     -.013328   .0102252    -1.30   0.192     -.033369     .006713
arrival_CS~3  
              
         L1.     .0108684   .0099075     1.10   0.273    -.0085499    .0302867
arrival_CS~2  
              
         L1.      .000636   .0217737     0.03   0.977    -.0420396    .0433116
arrival_CS~1  
              
         L1.    -.2216211   .0813173    -2.73   0.006    -.3810001    -.062242
arrival_CS~0  
              
         L1.    -.0039801   .0545318    -0.07   0.942    -.1108605    .1029003
arrival_CB~4  
              
         L1.    -.0150209   .0120785    -1.24   0.214    -.0386944    .0086526
arrival_CB~3  
              
         L1.    -.0122131   .0107093    -1.14   0.254    -.0332029    .0087767
arrival_CB~2  
              
         L1.     .0708499   .0177604     3.99   0.000     .0360401    .1056597
arrival_CB~1  
              
         L1.     .2893025   .0658469     4.39   0.000     .1602449      .41836
arrival_CB~0  
              
         L1.     .0305841   .0244315     1.25   0.211    -.0173007     .078469
arrival_Si_4  
              
         L1.     .0156099   .0099195     1.57   0.116    -.0038319    .0350517
arrival_Si_3  
              
         L1.     -.040736   .0083278    -4.89   0.000    -.0570582   -.0244138
arrival_Si_2  
              
         L1.     .0276739   .0215796     1.28   0.200    -.0146213    .0699691
arrival_Si_1  
              
         L1.    -.2874037   .0684839    -4.20   0.000    -.4216296   -.1531777
arrival_Si_0  
              
         L1.    -.0161822   .0526055    -0.31   0.758     -.119287    .0869226
arrival_Bi_4  
              
         L1.     .0012801    .010455     0.12   0.903    -.0192114    .0217716
arrival_Bi_3  
              
         L1.    -.0271751   .0092088    -2.95   0.003    -.0452241   -.0091261
arrival_Bi_2  
              
         L1.      -.39004   .0229661   -16.98   0.000    -.4350528   -.3450272
arrival_Bi_1  
              
         L1.     .1850618   .0553483     3.34   0.001      .076581    .2935425
arrival_Bi_0  
              
         L1.     .3313231   2.786413     0.12   0.905    -5.129946    5.792593
       ask_c  
              
         L1.     1.533572   2.196528     0.70   0.485    -2.771544    5.838689
       bid_c  
arrival_CB~1  
                                                                              
90 
 
 
  
       _cons    -598.9769   79.91051    -7.50   0.000    -755.5986   -442.3552
              
         L1.    -.0244545   .0702909    -0.35   0.728    -.1622221    .1133132
arrival_CS~4  
              
         L1.    -.0176785   .0242241    -0.73   0.466    -.0651569    .0297999
arrival_CS~3  
              
         L1.    -.0302322   .0234715    -1.29   0.198    -.0762354     .015771
arrival_CS~2  
              
         L1.     -.016891   .0515833    -0.33   0.743    -.1179923    .0842103
arrival_CS~1  
              
         L1.     .1035788    .192646     0.54   0.591    -.2740004     .481158
arrival_CS~0  
              
         L1.     .0543335   .1291894     0.42   0.674     -.198873      .30754
arrival_CB~4  
              
         L1.    -.0341952   .0286148    -1.20   0.232    -.0902792    .0218888
arrival_CB~3  
              
         L1.     .1642117    .025371     6.47   0.000     .1144856    .2139379
arrival_CB~2  
              
         L1.     .0635839   .0420756     1.51   0.131    -.0188827    .1460506
arrival_CB~1  
              
         L1.     .2411017   .1559955     1.55   0.122    -.0646438    .5468473
arrival_CB~0  
              
         L1.    -.0171142   .0578798    -0.30   0.767    -.1305564    .0963281
arrival_Si_4  
              
         L1.    -.0209036   .0234999    -0.89   0.374    -.0669625    .0251553
arrival_Si_3  
              
         L1.    -.0136021   .0197291    -0.69   0.491    -.0522705    .0250663
arrival_Si_2  
              
         L1.     .0155869   .0511234     0.30   0.760    -.0846132    .1157869
arrival_Si_1  
              
         L1.    -.1359413   .1622427    -0.84   0.402    -.4539312    .1820486
arrival_Si_0  
              
         L1.     .0258935   .1246257     0.21   0.835    -.2183685    .2701554
arrival_Bi_4  
              
         L1.    -.0153089   .0247687    -0.62   0.537    -.0638546    .0332368
arrival_Bi_3  
              
         L1.    -.1759067   .0218163    -8.06   0.000    -.2186658   -.1331475
arrival_Bi_2  
              
         L1.     .0314993   .0544083     0.58   0.563    -.0751389    .1381375
arrival_Bi_1  
              
         L1.     .3748627   .1311238     2.86   0.004     .1178649    .6318606
arrival_Bi_0  
              
         L1.    -8.538351   6.601191    -1.29   0.196    -21.47645    4.399746
       ask_c  
              
         L1.    -4.834881   5.203716    -0.93   0.353    -15.03398    5.364215
       bid_c  
arrival_CB~2  
                                                                              
91 
 
 
  
       _cons    -410.4645   59.91497    -6.85   0.000    -527.8957   -293.0333
              
         L1.    -.0363587   .0527024    -0.69   0.490    -.1396536    .0669361
arrival_CS~4  
              
         L1.    -.0048086   .0181627    -0.26   0.791    -.0404068    .0307895
arrival_CS~3  
              
         L1.     .0025067   .0175983     0.14   0.887    -.0319854    .0369988
arrival_CS~2  
              
         L1.     .0054009   .0386759     0.14   0.889    -.0704024    .0812042
arrival_CS~1  
              
         L1.    -.1383797   .1444413    -0.96   0.338    -.4214794    .1447201
arrival_CS~0  
              
         L1.     .2706641   .0968631     2.79   0.005      .080816    .4605123
arrival_CB~4  
              
         L1.      .007835   .0214547     0.37   0.715    -.0342154    .0498854
arrival_CB~3  
              
         L1.     .0320838   .0190225     1.69   0.092    -.0051997    .0693673
arrival_CB~2  
              
         L1.     .0055074   .0315473     0.17   0.861    -.0563241    .0673389
arrival_CB~1  
              
         L1.    -.1857209   .1169617    -1.59   0.112    -.4149616    .0435197
arrival_CB~0  
              
         L1.     .0134031   .0433968     0.31   0.757    -.0716531    .0984593
arrival_Si_4  
              
         L1.     .0145253   .0176196     0.82   0.410    -.0200085    .0490592
arrival_Si_3  
              
         L1.    -.0039988   .0147924    -0.27   0.787    -.0329914    .0249938
arrival_Si_2  
              
         L1.      .035358   .0383311     0.92   0.356    -.0397696    .1104855
arrival_Si_1  
              
         L1.    -.0762205   .1216457    -0.63   0.531    -.3146417    .1622006
arrival_Si_0  
              
         L1.    -.0074295   .0934414    -0.08   0.937    -.1905711    .1757122
arrival_Bi_4  
              
         L1.    -.1663511   .0185709    -8.96   0.000    -.2027495   -.1299527
arrival_Bi_3  
              
         L1.    -.0367347   .0163573    -2.25   0.025    -.0687945    -.004675
arrival_Bi_2  
              
         L1.     .0825116    .040794     2.02   0.043     .0025569    .1624664
arrival_Bi_1  
              
         L1.    -.0702813   .0983134    -0.71   0.475    -.2629721    .1224094
arrival_Bi_0  
              
         L1.    -3.388183   4.949413    -0.68   0.494    -13.08886    6.312489
       ask_c  
              
         L1.     3.933807    3.90162     1.01   0.313    -3.713228    11.58084
       bid_c  
arrival_CB~3  
                                                                              
92 
 
 
  
       _cons    -31.46873   14.03228    -2.24   0.025    -58.97149   -3.965972
              
         L1.     .0014727   .0123431     0.12   0.905    -.0227193    .0256647
arrival_CS~4  
              
         L1.     .0001574   .0042538     0.04   0.970    -.0081798    .0084946
arrival_CS~3  
              
         L1.      .003176   .0041216     0.77   0.441    -.0049021    .0112542
arrival_CS~2  
              
         L1.    -.0031437    .009058    -0.35   0.729    -.0208971    .0146097
arrival_CS~1  
              
         L1.    -.0386324   .0338286    -1.14   0.253    -.1049353    .0276705
arrival_CS~0  
              
         L1.     .2276926   .0226856    10.04   0.000     .1832295    .2721556
arrival_CB~4  
              
         L1.    -.0143619   .0050248    -2.86   0.004    -.0242103   -.0045136
arrival_CB~3  
              
         L1.      .010687   .0044551     2.40   0.016     .0019551    .0194189
arrival_CB~2  
              
         L1.     .0038008   .0073885     0.51   0.607    -.0106803    .0182819
arrival_CB~1  
              
         L1.     .0179953   .0273928     0.66   0.511    -.0356936    .0716842
arrival_CB~0  
              
         L1.     .0036682   .0101637     0.36   0.718    -.0162523    .0235886
arrival_Si_4  
              
         L1.     .0011472   .0041266     0.28   0.781    -.0069407    .0092352
arrival_Si_3  
              
         L1.     .0007231   .0034644     0.21   0.835    -.0060671    .0075132
arrival_Si_2  
              
         L1.     .0067707   .0089773     0.75   0.451    -.0108244    .0243658
arrival_Si_1  
              
         L1.    -.0030268   .0284898    -0.11   0.915    -.0588658    .0528122
arrival_Si_0  
              
         L1.    -.3467406   .0218843   -15.84   0.000     -.389633   -.3038482
arrival_Bi_4  
              
         L1.     .0305063   .0043494     7.01   0.000     .0219817    .0390309
arrival_Bi_3  
              
         L1.    -.0034188   .0038309    -0.89   0.372    -.0109273    .0040897
arrival_Bi_2  
              
         L1.     .0075126   .0095541     0.79   0.432     -.011213    .0262383
arrival_Bi_1  
              
         L1.     .0070724   .0230253     0.31   0.759    -.0380564    .0522012
arrival_Bi_0  
              
         L1.    -2.113926   1.159169    -1.82   0.068    -4.385854    .1580028
       ask_c  
              
         L1.     2.562799    .913772     2.80   0.005     .7718389    4.353759
       bid_c  
arrival_CB~4  
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       _cons    -40.92614   12.70619    -3.22   0.001    -65.82982   -16.02246
              
         L1.     .0011338   .0111766     0.10   0.919     -.020772    .0230395
arrival_CS~4  
              
         L1.    -.0038799   .0038518    -1.01   0.314    -.0114292    .0036694
arrival_CS~3  
              
         L1.      .004092   .0037321     1.10   0.273    -.0032228    .0114067
arrival_CS~2  
              
         L1.     .0124765    .008202     1.52   0.128    -.0035991    .0285521
arrival_CS~1  
              
         L1.    -.2178236   .0306317    -7.11   0.000    -.2778607   -.1577865
arrival_CS~0  
              
         L1.    -.0044125   .0205418    -0.21   0.830    -.0446736    .0358487
arrival_CB~4  
              
         L1.     -.007468   .0045499    -1.64   0.101    -.0163857    .0014496
arrival_CB~3  
              
         L1.     -.002158   .0040341    -0.53   0.593    -.0100648    .0057487
arrival_CB~2  
              
         L1.    -.0210481   .0066902    -3.15   0.002    -.0341607   -.0079354
arrival_CB~1  
              
         L1.     .0255745   .0248041     1.03   0.303    -.0230406    .0741897
arrival_CB~0  
              
         L1.      .003213   .0092032     0.35   0.727    -.0148249    .0212509
arrival_Si_4  
              
         L1.     .0035193   .0037366     0.94   0.346    -.0038043    .0108429
arrival_Si_3  
              
         L1.     .0014111    .003137     0.45   0.653    -.0047374    .0075596
arrival_Si_2  
              
         L1.    -.0067122   .0081289    -0.83   0.409    -.0226445    .0092201
arrival_Si_1  
              
         L1.    -.4605128   .0257974   -17.85   0.000    -.5110749   -.4099508
arrival_Si_0  
              
         L1.    -.0019645   .0198161    -0.10   0.921    -.0408034    .0368744
arrival_Bi_4  
              
         L1.    -.0060924   .0039383    -1.55   0.122    -.0138114    .0016266
arrival_Bi_3  
              
         L1.    -.0027628   .0034689    -0.80   0.426    -.0095617    .0040362
arrival_Bi_2  
              
         L1.    -.0250994   .0086512    -2.90   0.004    -.0420554   -.0081433
arrival_Bi_1  
              
         L1.     .0160465   .0208494     0.77   0.442    -.0248175    .0569105
arrival_Bi_0  
              
         L1.    -1.128524   1.049624    -1.08   0.282     -3.18575    .9287013
       ask_c  
              
         L1.    -.2092607   .8274182    -0.25   0.800    -1.830971    1.412449
       bid_c  
arrival_CS~0  
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       _cons    -211.9145   43.54106    -4.87   0.000    -297.2534   -126.5756
              
         L1.     -.015739   .0382996    -0.41   0.681    -.0908049    .0593268
arrival_CS~4  
              
         L1.    -.0446566   .0131991    -3.38   0.001    -.0705263    -.018787
arrival_CS~3  
              
         L1.     .0051705    .012789     0.40   0.686    -.0198954    .0302364
arrival_CS~2  
              
         L1.     .1187098   .0281063     4.22   0.000     .0636224    .1737971
arrival_CS~1  
              
         L1.     .0345366   .1049675     0.33   0.742     -.171196    .2402692
arrival_CS~0  
              
         L1.    -.0237861   .0703918    -0.34   0.735    -.1617514    .1141792
arrival_CB~4  
              
         L1.     .0179966   .0155914     1.15   0.248     -.012562    .0485552
arrival_CB~3  
              
         L1.     .0233621   .0138239     1.69   0.091    -.0037323    .0504565
arrival_CB~2  
              
         L1.    -.1037194   .0229258    -4.52   0.000    -.1486532   -.0587855
arrival_CB~1  
              
         L1.     .1097528   .0849977     1.29   0.197    -.0568396    .2763452
arrival_CB~0  
              
         L1.     .0057761   .0315371     0.18   0.855    -.0560355    .0675877
arrival_Si_4  
              
         L1.    -.0312109   .0128044    -2.44   0.015    -.0563072   -.0061147
arrival_Si_3  
              
         L1.     .0122222   .0107499     1.14   0.256    -.0088471    .0332916
arrival_Si_2  
              
         L1.    -.5221765   .0278557   -18.75   0.000    -.5767728   -.4675803
arrival_Si_1  
              
         L1.     .0629397   .0884016     0.71   0.476    -.1103244    .2362037
arrival_Si_0  
              
         L1.     .0064932   .0679052     0.10   0.924    -.1265985    .1395848
arrival_Bi_4  
              
         L1.     .0115873   .0134958     0.86   0.391    -.0148639    .0380385
arrival_Bi_3  
              
         L1.    -.0074937   .0118871    -0.63   0.528     -.030792    .0158046
arrival_Bi_2  
              
         L1.    -.0109166   .0296456    -0.37   0.713    -.0690209    .0471876
arrival_Bi_1  
              
         L1.      .111238   .0714458     1.56   0.119    -.0287931    .2512692
arrival_Bi_0  
              
         L1.    -5.258833   3.596809    -1.46   0.144    -12.30845    1.790783
       ask_c  
              
         L1.     4.407038   2.835363     1.55   0.120    -1.150171    9.964247
       bid_c  
arrival_CS~1  
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       _cons    -777.4303   96.32345    -8.07   0.000    -966.2208   -588.6398
              
         L1.    -.0353449   .0847281    -0.42   0.677    -.2014089    .1307191
arrival_CS~4  
              
         L1.     .0908057   .0291995     3.11   0.002     .0335756    .1480357
arrival_CS~3  
              
         L1.     .0831653   .0282923     2.94   0.003     .0277134    .1386172
arrival_CS~2  
              
         L1.     .0474401    .062178     0.76   0.445    -.0744266    .1693068
arrival_CS~1  
              
         L1.     .2993727   .2322138     1.29   0.197     -.155758    .7545034
arrival_CS~0  
              
         L1.     .0431356   .1557238     0.28   0.782    -.2620774    .3483486
arrival_CB~4  
              
         L1.     .0032229    .034492     0.09   0.926    -.0643802    .0708261
arrival_CB~3  
              
         L1.    -.0550356   .0305819    -1.80   0.072    -.1149751    .0049039
arrival_CB~2  
              
         L1.    -.1417778   .0507175    -2.80   0.005    -.2411824   -.0423733
arrival_CB~1  
              
         L1.     .4238049   .1880357     2.25   0.024     .0552618     .792348
arrival_CB~0  
              
         L1.     .0205389   .0697678     0.29   0.768    -.1162034    .1572812
arrival_Si_4  
              
         L1.     .0085601   .0283265     0.30   0.763    -.0469589    .0640791
arrival_Si_3  
              
         L1.    -.0587126   .0237813    -2.47   0.014    -.1053231   -.0121021
arrival_Si_2  
              
         L1.    -.0802895   .0616237    -1.30   0.193    -.2010697    .0404908
arrival_Si_1  
              
         L1.     .2660277    .195566     1.36   0.174    -.1172746      .64933
arrival_Si_0  
              
         L1.     .0809401   .1502228     0.54   0.590    -.2134912    .3753714
arrival_Bi_4  
              
         L1.    -.0073183   .0298559    -0.25   0.806    -.0658349    .0511982
arrival_Bi_3  
              
         L1.    -.1003526   .0262972    -3.82   0.000    -.1518942   -.0488111
arrival_Bi_2  
              
         L1.    -.0847639   .0655832    -1.29   0.196    -.2133047    .0437769
arrival_Bi_1  
              
         L1.     .1947063   .1580555     1.23   0.218    -.1150767    .5044894
arrival_Bi_0  
              
         L1.    -.1490543    7.95702    -0.02   0.985    -15.74453    15.44642
       ask_c  
              
         L1.     2.358627   6.272515     0.38   0.707    -9.935276    14.65253
       bid_c  
arrival_CS~2  
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        _cons    -418.2385   82.07523    -5.10   0.000     -579.103    -257.374
              
         L1.    -.0599016   .0721951    -0.83   0.407    -.2014013    .0815981
arrival_CS~4  
              
         L1.     .0411053   .0248803     1.65   0.099    -.0076593    .0898698
arrival_CS~3  
              
         L1.     .0009477   .0241073     0.04   0.969    -.0463017    .0481971
arrival_CS~2  
              
         L1.    -.0018426   .0529806    -0.03   0.972    -.1056827    .1019975
arrival_CS~1  
              
         L1.    -.3223697   .1978646    -1.63   0.103    -.7101773    .0654378
arrival_CS~0  
              
         L1.    -.0487831    .132689    -0.37   0.713    -.3088489    .2112826
arrival_CB~4  
              
         L1.     .0177184     .02939     0.60   0.547    -.0398848    .0753217
arrival_CB~3  
              
         L1.     .0034343   .0260582     0.13   0.895    -.0476389    .0545075
arrival_CB~2  
              
         L1.    -.0574334   .0432154    -1.33   0.184     -.142134    .0272672
arrival_CB~1  
              
         L1.      .042134   .1602213     0.26   0.793    -.2718941     .356162
arrival_CB~0  
              
         L1.    -.1561281   .0594477    -2.63   0.009    -.2726434   -.0396128
arrival_Si_4  
              
         L1.     -.147203   .0241365    -6.10   0.000    -.1945096   -.0998964
arrival_Si_3  
              
         L1.    -.0720136   .0202636    -3.55   0.000    -.1117295   -.0322978
arrival_Si_2  
              
         L1.     .0197519   .0525083     0.38   0.707    -.0831625    .1226662
arrival_Si_1  
              
         L1.     .1571861   .1666378     0.94   0.346    -.1694179    .4837901
arrival_Si_0  
              
         L1.    -.0164807   .1280018    -0.13   0.898    -.2673595    .2343981
arrival_Bi_4  
              
         L1.     .0337784   .0254396     1.33   0.184    -.0160823    .0836392
arrival_Bi_3  
              
         L1.    -.0623202   .0224073    -2.78   0.005    -.1062377   -.0184027
arrival_Bi_2  
              
         L1.    -.0711906   .0558821    -1.27   0.203    -.1807176    .0383363
arrival_Bi_1  
              
         L1.    -.0213768   .1346758    -0.16   0.874    -.2853366     .242583
arrival_Bi_0  
              
         L1.     8.810524   6.780013     1.30   0.194    -4.478057    22.09911
       ask_c  
              
         L1.    -7.304984   5.344681    -1.37   0.172    -17.78037    3.170397
       bid_c  
arrival_CS~3  
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       _cons    -21.09391   24.47375    -0.86   0.389    -69.06157    26.87375
              
         L1.    -.0090387   .0215276    -0.42   0.675     -.051232    .0331546
arrival_CS~4  
              
         L1.     .0014983    .007419     0.20   0.840    -.0130426    .0160393
arrival_CS~3  
              
         L1.     .0100224   .0071885     1.39   0.163    -.0040668    .0241115
arrival_CS~2  
              
         L1.    -.0024167   .0157981    -0.15   0.878    -.0333804    .0285471
arrival_CS~1  
              
         L1.     .0031288   .0590006     0.05   0.958    -.1125103    .1187679
arrival_CS~0  
              
         L1.    -.0090907   .0395661    -0.23   0.818    -.0866389    .0684574
arrival_CB~4  
              
         L1.    -.0158358   .0087637    -1.81   0.071    -.0330124    .0013407
arrival_CB~3  
              
         L1.    -.0049689   .0077702    -0.64   0.523    -.0201982    .0102605
arrival_CB~2  
              
         L1.     .0170592   .0128863     1.32   0.186    -.0081974    .0423158
arrival_CB~1  
              
         L1.     .0428923   .0477759     0.90   0.369    -.0507467    .1365313
arrival_CB~0  
              
         L1.    -.4475799   .0177265   -25.25   0.000    -.4823232   -.4128366
arrival_Si_4  
              
         L1.     .0080914   .0071972     1.12   0.261    -.0060148    .0221976
arrival_Si_3  
              
         L1.     .0007731   .0060423     0.13   0.898    -.0110697    .0126158
arrival_Si_2  
              
         L1.      .021461   .0156573     1.37   0.170    -.0092267    .0521487
arrival_Si_1  
              
         L1.     .0321517   .0496892     0.65   0.518    -.0652373    .1295407
arrival_Si_0  
              
         L1.    -.0087428   .0381684    -0.23   0.819    -.0835515    .0660659
arrival_Bi_4  
              
         L1.    -.0098854   .0075858    -1.30   0.193    -.0247532    .0049825
arrival_Bi_3  
              
         L1.    -.0262262   .0066816    -3.93   0.000    -.0393218   -.0131305
arrival_Bi_2  
              
         L1.    -.0081703   .0166633    -0.49   0.624    -.0408298    .0244892
arrival_Bi_1  
              
         L1.     .0335793   .0401585     0.84   0.403      -.04513    .1122886
arrival_Bi_0  
              
         L1.    -1.059406    2.02171    -0.52   0.600    -5.021885    2.903073
       ask_c  
              
         L1.     .1713749   1.593713     0.11   0.914    -2.952245    3.294995
       bid_c  
arrival_CS~4  
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APPENDIX B: Results for regression (III) 
Because of space limitations, two sample regressions are provided for each security in the sample 
data 
Sampo 25th November (ݐ=150ms) 
 
Sampo 25th November (ݐ=150ms) 
 
  
                                                                              
       _cons     1.64e-06   1.88e-06     0.87   0.382    -2.04e-06    5.32e-06
arrival_Si_5     8.81e-08   2.07e-08     4.25   0.000     4.75e-08    1.29e-07
arrival_Si_4     4.61e-09   1.47e-08     0.31   0.753    -2.41e-08    3.33e-08
arrival_Si_3     2.93e-09   5.53e-09     0.53   0.596    -7.92e-09    1.38e-08
arrival_Si_2     1.30e-09   4.16e-09     0.31   0.755    -6.86e-09    9.45e-09
arrival_Si_1    -8.84e-09   5.99e-09    -1.47   0.140    -2.06e-08    2.91e-09
arrival_Si_0    -6.18e-08   1.88e-08    -3.29   0.001    -9.87e-08   -2.50e-08
arrival_Bi_5    -3.16e-08   1.38e-08    -2.30   0.022    -5.86e-08   -4.62e-09
arrival_Bi_4    -3.05e-08   1.31e-08    -2.32   0.020    -5.63e-08   -4.78e-09
arrival_Bi_3     2.45e-08   6.38e-09     3.84   0.000     1.20e-08    3.70e-08
arrival_Bi_2    -3.63e-09   4.39e-09    -0.83   0.408    -1.22e-08    4.98e-09
arrival_Bi_1     7.73e-09   7.01e-09     1.10   0.270    -6.01e-09    2.15e-08
arrival_Bi_0     7.68e-08   2.44e-08     3.15   0.002     2.90e-08    1.25e-07
                                                                              
p_change_l~d        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    .000074109  5677  1.3054e-08           Root MSE      =  .00011
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0104
    Residual    .000073184  5665  1.2919e-08           R-squared     =  0.0125
       Model    9.2439e-07    12  7.7032e-08           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F( 12,  5665) =    5.96
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    5678
                                                                              
       _cons     1.64e-06   1.88e-06     0.87   0.382    -2.04e-06    5.32e-06
arrival_Si_5     8.81e-08   2.07e-08     4.25   0.000     4.75e-08    1.29e-07
arrival_Si_4     4.61e-09   1.47e-08     0.31   0.753    -2.41e-08    3.33e-08
arrival_Si_3     2.93e-09   5.53e-09     0.53   0.596    -7.92e-09    1.38e-08
arrival_Si_2     1.30e-09   4.16e-09     0.31   0.755    -6.86e-09    9.45e-09
arrival_Si_1    -8.84e-09   5.99e-09    -1.47   0.140    -2.06e-08    2.91e-09
arrival_Si_0    -6.18e-08   1.88e-08    -3.29   0.001    -9.87e-08   -2.50e-08
arrival_Bi_5    -3.16e-08   1.38e-08    -2.30   0.022    -5.86e-08   -4.62e-09
arrival_Bi_4    -3.05e-08   1.31e-08    -2.32   0.020    -5.63e-08   -4.78e-09
arrival_Bi_3     2.45e-08   6.38e-09     3.84   0.000     1.20e-08    3.70e-08
arrival_Bi_2    -3.63e-09   4.39e-09    -0.83   0.408    -1.22e-08    4.98e-09
arrival_Bi_1     7.73e-09   7.01e-09     1.10   0.270    -6.01e-09    2.15e-08
arrival_Bi_0     7.68e-08   2.44e-08     3.15   0.002     2.90e-08    1.25e-07
                                                                              
p_change_l~d        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    .000074109  5677  1.3054e-08           Root MSE      =  .00011
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0104
    Residual    .000073184  5665  1.2919e-08           R-squared     =  0.0125
       Model    9.2439e-07    12  7.7032e-08           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F( 12,  5665) =    5.96
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    5678
99 
 
Fortum 22nd November (ݐ=150ms) 
 
Fortum 25th November (ݐ=150ms) 
 
                                                                              
       _cons    -3.16e-07   1.81e-06    -0.17   0.862    -3.87e-06    3.24e-06
arrival_Si_5     2.54e-07   9.15e-08     2.78   0.005     7.52e-08    4.34e-07
arrival_Si_4    -1.14e-08   1.27e-08    -0.89   0.372    -3.63e-08    1.36e-08
arrival_Si_3     9.42e-09   3.97e-09     2.37   0.018     1.63e-09    1.72e-08
arrival_Si_2    -3.93e-09   2.89e-09    -1.36   0.174    -9.59e-09    1.73e-09
arrival_Si_1    -1.97e-08   6.86e-09    -2.87   0.004    -3.32e-08   -6.27e-09
arrival_Si_0    -4.02e-08   2.01e-08    -1.99   0.046    -7.96e-08   -6.71e-10
arrival_Bi_5    -9.19e-08   4.86e-08    -1.89   0.059    -1.87e-07    3.35e-09
arrival_Bi_4    -1.04e-08   9.28e-09    -1.13   0.260    -2.86e-08    7.74e-09
arrival_Bi_3    -3.47e-09   3.99e-09    -0.87   0.384    -1.13e-08    4.35e-09
arrival_Bi_2     2.11e-09   3.79e-09     0.56   0.579    -5.33e-09    9.54e-09
arrival_Bi_1     2.62e-08   7.86e-09     3.34   0.001     1.08e-08    4.16e-08
arrival_Bi_0     3.02e-08   2.08e-08     1.45   0.147    -1.06e-08    7.09e-08
                                                                              
p_change_l~d        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    .000089112  6611  1.3479e-08           Root MSE      =  .00012
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0054
    Residual    .000088473  6599  1.3407e-08           R-squared     =  0.0072
       Model    6.3922e-07    12  5.3268e-08           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F( 12,  6599) =    3.97
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    6612
                                                                              
       _cons     2.58e-06   2.61e-06     0.99   0.323    -2.54e-06    7.69e-06
arrival_Si_5     3.60e-07   1.11e-07     3.25   0.001     1.43e-07    5.77e-07
arrival_Si_4     3.79e-09   4.37e-08     0.09   0.931    -8.19e-08    8.95e-08
arrival_Si_3     2.26e-09   7.44e-09     0.30   0.761    -1.23e-08    1.68e-08
arrival_Si_2     4.81e-09   4.51e-09     1.07   0.287    -4.03e-09    1.36e-08
arrival_Si_1     8.87e-09   1.14e-08     0.78   0.437    -1.35e-08    3.12e-08
arrival_Si_0    -8.62e-08   1.96e-08    -4.40   0.000    -1.25e-07   -4.78e-08
arrival_Bi_5    -1.23e-08   1.81e-07    -0.07   0.946    -3.68e-07    3.43e-07
arrival_Bi_4     1.89e-08   5.22e-08     0.36   0.717    -8.35e-08    1.21e-07
arrival_Bi_3    -9.18e-09   8.67e-09    -1.06   0.290    -2.62e-08    7.81e-09
arrival_Bi_2    -2.82e-09   4.94e-09    -0.57   0.568    -1.25e-08    6.87e-09
arrival_Bi_1     1.70e-08   1.26e-08     1.35   0.178    -7.76e-09    4.18e-08
arrival_Bi_0     4.44e-08   1.32e-08     3.37   0.001     1.86e-08    7.03e-08
                                                                              
p_change_l~d        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    .000061126  3693  1.6552e-08           Root MSE      =  .00013
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0092
    Residual    .000060368  3681  1.6400e-08           R-squared     =  0.0124
       Model    7.5832e-07    12  6.3193e-08           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F( 12,  3681) =    3.85
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    3694
100 
 
UPM 24th November (t=150ms)
 
UPM 26th November (ݐ=150ms) 
 
  
                                                                              
       _cons     3.58e-07   2.64e-06     0.14   0.892    -4.82e-06    5.54e-06
arrival_Si_5     1.83e-08   1.82e-08     1.01   0.314    -1.73e-08    5.39e-08
arrival_Si_4     2.82e-08   8.78e-09     3.22   0.001     1.10e-08    4.54e-08
arrival_Si_3     1.56e-09   5.09e-09     0.31   0.759    -8.41e-09    1.15e-08
arrival_Si_2    -5.83e-09   2.72e-09    -2.14   0.032    -1.12e-08   -4.95e-10
arrival_Si_1    -6.69e-09   6.37e-09    -1.05   0.294    -1.92e-08    5.80e-09
arrival_Si_0    -1.26e-07   3.07e-08    -4.12   0.000    -1.87e-07   -6.62e-08
arrival_Bi_5     3.98e-09   2.42e-08     0.16   0.869    -4.34e-08    5.13e-08
arrival_Bi_4    -4.90e-08   1.09e-08    -4.51   0.000    -7.03e-08   -2.77e-08
arrival_Bi_3    -6.47e-09   5.62e-09    -1.15   0.250    -1.75e-08    4.55e-09
arrival_Bi_2     5.57e-09   3.21e-09     1.73   0.083    -7.27e-10    1.19e-08
arrival_Bi_1     1.46e-08   5.45e-09     2.68   0.007     3.93e-09    2.53e-08
arrival_Bi_0     4.81e-08   2.78e-08     1.73   0.083    -6.34e-09    1.03e-07
                                                                              
p_change_l~d        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total     .00027446  7564  3.6285e-08           Root MSE      =  .00019
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0080
    Residual     .00027182  7552  3.5993e-08           R-squared     =  0.0096
       Model    2.6400e-06    12  2.2000e-07           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F( 12,  7552) =    6.11
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    7565
                                                                              
       _cons    -2.49e-06   3.13e-06    -0.79   0.427    -8.63e-06    3.66e-06
arrival_Si_5    -8.00e-09   3.36e-08    -0.24   0.812    -7.38e-08    5.78e-08
arrival_Si_4     1.47e-08   2.86e-08     0.51   0.608    -4.14e-08    7.07e-08
arrival_Si_3     8.38e-10   4.18e-09     0.20   0.841    -7.36e-09    9.04e-09
arrival_Si_2     2.08e-09   3.16e-09     0.66   0.510    -4.11e-09    8.27e-09
arrival_Si_1    -1.63e-08   5.82e-09    -2.81   0.005    -2.78e-08   -4.93e-09
arrival_Si_0     1.93e-08   3.31e-08     0.58   0.560    -4.56e-08    8.42e-08
arrival_Bi_5    -1.33e-07   8.64e-08    -1.53   0.125    -3.02e-07    3.68e-08
arrival_Bi_4    -2.78e-08   3.17e-08    -0.88   0.380    -9.01e-08    3.44e-08
arrival_Bi_3     1.20e-09   5.86e-09     0.21   0.838    -1.03e-08    1.27e-08
arrival_Bi_2     2.44e-09   3.04e-09     0.80   0.422    -3.52e-09    8.39e-09
arrival_Bi_1     1.96e-08   6.21e-09     3.16   0.002     7.43e-09    3.18e-08
arrival_Bi_0     2.29e-09   3.35e-08     0.07   0.946    -6.34e-08    6.80e-08
                                                                              
p_change_l~d        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    .000233185  5983  3.8975e-08           Root MSE      =   .0002
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0025
    Residual    .000232142  5971  3.8878e-08           R-squared     =  0.0045
       Model    1.0431e-06    12  8.6924e-08           Prob > F      =  0.0083
                                                       F( 12,  5971) =    2.24
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    5984
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       _cons     2.42e-06   1.38e-06     1.75   0.080    -2.90e-07    5.13e-06
arrival_Si_5     6.17e-10   1.39e-09     0.45   0.656    -2.10e-09    3.33e-09
arrival_Si_4    -5.35e-10   6.55e-10    -0.82   0.414    -1.82e-09    7.49e-10
arrival_Si_3     2.15e-10   3.66e-10     0.59   0.558    -5.03e-10    9.33e-10
arrival_Si_2    -9.76e-10   5.49e-10    -1.78   0.076    -2.05e-09    1.01e-10
arrival_Si_1    -1.10e-08   1.86e-09    -5.95   0.000    -1.47e-08   -7.41e-09
arrival_Si_0    -9.85e-09   7.82e-09    -1.26   0.208    -2.52e-08    5.49e-09
arrival_Bi_5    -2.28e-09   1.93e-09    -1.18   0.237    -6.06e-09    1.50e-09
arrival_Bi_4    -6.50e-10   5.35e-10    -1.22   0.224    -1.70e-09    3.98e-10
arrival_Bi_3    -7.75e-10   4.19e-10    -1.85   0.064    -1.60e-09    4.62e-11
arrival_Bi_2    -7.47e-10   6.00e-10    -1.25   0.213    -1.92e-09    4.29e-10
arrival_Bi_1     2.54e-09   1.35e-09     1.88   0.060    -1.06e-10    5.18e-09
arrival_Bi_0     7.26e-09   3.25e-09     2.24   0.025     8.95e-10    1.36e-08
                                                                              
p_change_l~d        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    .000382715 15920  2.4040e-08           Root MSE      =  .00015
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0032
    Residual    .000381186 15908  2.3962e-08           R-squared     =  0.0040
       Model    1.5287e-06    12  1.2739e-07           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F( 12, 15908) =    5.32
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =   15921
                                                                              
       _cons     3.78e-07   1.72e-06     0.22   0.826    -2.99e-06    3.74e-06
arrival_Si_5     6.34e-09   1.42e-09     4.47   0.000     3.56e-09    9.12e-09
arrival_Si_4     2.33e-09   8.93e-10     2.61   0.009     5.79e-10    4.08e-09
arrival_Si_3    -6.61e-10   5.30e-10    -1.25   0.212    -1.70e-09    3.77e-10
arrival_Si_2    -1.58e-09   6.99e-10    -2.26   0.024    -2.95e-09   -2.09e-10
arrival_Si_1    -1.51e-09   1.84e-09    -0.82   0.411    -5.12e-09    2.10e-09
arrival_Si_0    -8.72e-09   5.22e-09    -1.67   0.095    -1.89e-08    1.51e-09
arrival_Bi_5    -7.43e-10   1.93e-09    -0.39   0.700    -4.53e-09    3.04e-09
arrival_Bi_4     2.81e-09   9.99e-10     2.82   0.005     8.55e-10    4.77e-09
arrival_Bi_3    -1.81e-10   5.87e-10    -0.31   0.758    -1.33e-09    9.69e-10
arrival_Bi_2    -1.08e-09   6.84e-10    -1.58   0.114    -2.42e-09    2.59e-10
arrival_Bi_1     4.55e-09   1.93e-09     2.36   0.018     7.74e-10    8.33e-09
arrival_Bi_0    -5.24e-10   6.56e-09    -0.08   0.936    -1.34e-08    1.23e-08
                                                                              
p_change_l~d        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    .000239026 10272  2.3270e-08           Root MSE      =  .00015
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0048
    Residual    .000237595 10260  2.3157e-08           R-squared     =  0.0060
       Model    1.4310e-06    12  1.1925e-07           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F( 12, 10260) =    5.15
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =   10273
